Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: THE ROOTS OF PLURALISM BREAKDOWN

Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: THE ROOTS OF PLURALISM BREAKDOWN
Neil DeVotta | Wake Forest University

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April 2

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I. INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka represents a classic case of a country operating on the ethnic and political fronts when pluralism is deliberately eschewed. At independence in 1948, Sinhalese elites fully marginalising the Tamil minority was bound to cause this territorialised community
to eventually hit back, but they succumbed to ethnocentrism and majoritarianism anyway.1
What were the factors that motivated them to do so? There is no single explanation for why Sri embraces reversed pluralism: a Buddhist revival in reaction to colonialism that allowed Buddhist nationalists to combine their community’s socioeconomic territorialised grievances with ethnic and religious identities; the absence of minority guarantees in the Constitution, based
on the Soulbury Commission, the British set up before granting the island independence; political opportunism among especially Sinhalese, but also Tamil elites who manipulated ethnonationalism when seeking power; and the sectarian violence that congealed and hardened attitudes over time contributed to majoritarianism. Multiple issues, including colonialism, a sense of Sinhalese Buddhist entitlement rooted in mytho-history, economic grievances, politics, nationalism and communal violence, all interacting with and
stemming from each other, pushed the island towards majoritarianism. This, in turn, then led to ethnic riots, a civil war accompanied by terrorism that ultimately killed over 100,000 people, democratic regression, accusations of war crimes and authoritarianism.
The new government led by President Maithripala Sirisena, which came to power in January 2015, has managed to extricate itself
from this authoritarianism and is now trying to revive democratic institutions, promoting good governance and a degree of pluralism. This will not be easy, given the majoritarian mindset that has become embedded, as well as the undermining and weakening of state institutions that nearly
This paper is part of a new publication series from the Global Centre for Pluralism called Accounting for Change
in Diverse Societies. Focused on six world regions, each “change case” examines a specific moment in time when a country altered its approach to diversity, either expanding or eroding the foundations of inclusive citizenship. The aim of the series – which also features thematic overviews by leading global scholars – is to build a global understanding of the sources of inclusion and exclusion in diverse societies and the pathways to pluralism.
Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka three decades of civil war and post-conflict authoritarianism promoted. But, hopefully, the lessons learned can now enable a more inclusive society that emphasises common citizenship over divisive ethno-religious identities. In covering the long story of post-independence
Sri Lankan politics and the way it hampered pluralism, this case narrative is divided into four sections. The first look at ethno-religious highlights religion in the country’s ethno-religious demographics and how they influenced public policies that undermined what could have been a liberal democracy. It focuses
on the numerous moves away from a strategy to build pluralism, and how and why this happened at each moment. The second section discusses the consequences resulting from the anti-pluralism policies, with a focus on ethnic relations and democracy. The third briefly evaluates ongoing attempts to rectify the mistakes of the past while arguing that majoritarianism that has been institutionalized makes it very
unlikely Sri Lanka will strike a blow for a full-fed pluralism. The final section recaps the preceding narrative in list form so as to link it to the four drivers representing the Governance of Diversity section of this project.
II. DEFENESTRATING PLURALISM
Sri Lanka was colonized for almost 450 years,
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First by the Portuguese, and then by the Dutch and British. This heritage has shaped the country’s ethno-religious makeup. According to the 2012 census, the island’s ethnic breakdown was as follows: Sinhalese 74.9%, Sri Lankan Tamil 11.2%, Indian Tamil 4.1%, Moors (Muslim)
9.3% and others 0.5%. In terms of religion, the island was 70.1% Buddhist, 12.6% Hindu, 7.6% Christian (with 6.2% being Roman Catholic)
and 9.7% Muslim. Muslims were 7.5% in 1981, and that religious community’s high fertility rate has been of concern for some Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. In this context, it is worth noting, however, that, over the past century, it is the majority community’s numbers that have mainly risen: in the 1911 census, the Sinhalese and Buddhists only accounted for 66% and 60%, respectively as compared to 75% and 70% in 2012.2 Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic dynamics in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies are complicated, and Sri Lanka is no different.
The island’s Muslims mainly speak Tamil (although many Muslim youth now also speak Sinhala), but they have consciously used their Islamic identity as their primary identity to differentiate themselves from ethnic Tamils.

While approximately 10% of Sinhalese and 7% of Tamils are (mainly Catholic) Christians, one today rarely runs into Sinhalese Hindus and Tamil Buddhists, although Tamil areas in both India and Sri Lanka harboured Buddhist devotees in earlier times.
Sri Lanka (called Ceylon until 1972) is Asia’s oldest democracy, having achieved the universal franchise in 1931, just three years after the colonial power Britain adopted it. The country was granted independence in February 1948 without the instability in neighbouring India, which gained 2 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka its freedom following decades of anti-colonial struggle, communal violence and Partition.
Indeed, the transfer of power to independent Ceylon was so tranquil that many in the interior failed to grasp the moment’s significance. By the time power was transferred, civil society associations (organized both along ethnoreligious and secular lines) were numerous, and leftist political parties led by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Lanka Equal Society Party, LSSP) and Communist Party of Ceylon (CP) had played a leading role socializing people politically. The United National Party (UNP) was created just before independence, and its leaders were influential in negotiating the Constitution that Britain’s Soulbury Commission designed.3
The period from the late 1930s to mid-1940s had seen some ethnic tension as Tamils clamoured for “fifty-fifty” representation between the minorities (Tamils and others) and the Sinhalese. This claim meant that the Sinhalese, who were nearly
70% of the population would only have 50% of representatives within the legislature. Neither the Sinhalese nor the British thought much of the demand. Instead, a weighting formula was adopted to address Tamils’ concerns, but it still ensured that the Sinhalese would be a majority in 75 of 95 constituencies.4 Yet, notwithstanding differences regarding representation, Sinhalese
and Tamil elites came together to promote a united front when discussing independence, thanks to the faith both groups placed in D.S. Senanayake, the UNP leader who became Sri Lanka’s first prime minister.

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Political elites play a leading role in determining a country’s political development, and the belief that Senanayake could be trusted to treat minorities fairly influenced both the Tamils and the British in how they approached independence.

If trust in Senanayake was responsible for the informal elite pact that led to minority guarantees being de-emphasized within the Constitution, the camaraderie he fostered across ethnic lines caused observers to believe that, of those states gaining independence following the First World War, Sri Lanka had “the best chance of making a successful transition to modern statehood.”5

Senanayake died unexpectedly in 1952, and the ethnocentric policies rooted in linguistic nationalism that soon thereafter took shape caused even Britain’s constitutional engineers to realize that they had made a serious blunder in not instituting ironclad minority guarantees.6

A constitution is a country’s most important institution and represents its foremost governing “hardware.” What gets included and excluded in a constitution conditions the degree of institutionalization and the trajectory of ethno-religious narratives and interactions (i.e., the country’s “software”) that subsequently take shape.

The political structure the post-colonial Constitution created, in a country with a clear ethnic majority, lacked a bill of rights or specific minority guarantees, which made defenestrating pluralism quite a simple task for those advocating majoritarianism.

III. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

The first major instance of exclusion was perpetrated against Indian Tamils, also called Hill Country Tamils, Up-Country Tamils, or Estate Tamils, since most continued to work on tea plantations, as did their ancestors who came to the country as indentured labourers beginning in the 1830s.

The community was denied citizenship within a year of independence. In an island replete with crosscutting cleavages, caste-conscious Sri Lankan Tamils supported this disenfranchisement, as did local and British businessmen (including tea estate owners) who feared these Tamil labourers, who had voted overwhelmingly against the pro-West and pro-trade UNP in the 1947 general election, would be easily manipulated by the country’s leftist parties.

Yet, the UNP representatives’ demands when negotiating with the Indian government regarding the plight of Estate Tamils made clear the extent to which Sinhalese Buddhist ethnocentrism was motivating the island’s position towards minorities, in this instance against longstanding residents who had contributed much to the economy.7

It was not until the 1990s that all Indian Tamils were granted citizenship, but thanks mainly to forced repatriation to India in the 1960s and 1970s, the Indian Tamil population that comprised 12% of the population in 1946 was down to 4% in 2012.8

This was a first pivot point away from pluralism, the first instance when post-independence Sri Lanka deliberately excluded a minority group, with ethnicity, economics, and political ideology all playing a role in the decision.

The episode also created a precedent that emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists who have since repeatedly resorted to sectarianism to exclude and disempower the island’s minorities.

Buddhism has played a major role in Sri Lanka and contributed to the island’s unique character. Its influence is noted in a history book called the Mahavamsa (Great Chronicle), which documents a chronology of Sinhalese kings beginning in 543 BCE, although scholars believe the text was first put together by Buddhist monks around the sixth century CE.

According to the mytho-historical Mahavamsa, the Sinhalese are the progeny of a union between a princess and a lion, they originate from around West Bengal in India, and they were chosen by Lord Buddha to preserve and propagate his teachings to the world (dhamma) via Sri Lanka.

The latter belief is the basis for Sri Lanka being considered sinhadipa (island of the Sinhalese) and dhammadipa (island containing Buddha’s teachings), and the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology justifying majority domination and minority subordination.

It is also the basis for Buddhism being provided special status in the 1972 Constitution, Buddhist clergy commanding significant influence in the island’s political affairs, and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists insisting on the island being a unitary state, as opposed to accepting power being devolved along federal or other lines.9

Buddhist tenets and the Buddhist ethos are compatible with pluralism, but Sinhalese Buddhist political entrepreneurs and Buddhist leaders have instead chosen to eagerly project themselves as defenders of sinhadipa and dhammadipa, which in turn has ensured politics that devalues pluralism.

As the eminent scholar and monk Walpola Rahula argued:

“Get this straight and quote me. Sri Lanka is a Buddhist Sinhala country. Let no one make a mistake. Seventy percent of the country consists of Buddhists and Sinhala people. Also make this clear that Sri Lanka is the only Buddhist Sinhala country in the world. If we don’t live here, are the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and some of the Tamil parties asking us to jump into the sea?

I got angry with [former Sri Lankan President] Premadasa because he chose to call Sri Lanka a multi-national and multi-religious state. No. It is a Buddhist Sinhala state…”10

Aspects of Sinhalese Buddhist history are clearly mythic, fantastic, and substantially embellished, but one must appreciate how deeply notions of sinhadipa and dhammadipa are entrenched in order to understand the stridency of the likes of Walpola Rahula, and why this belief system has thus far negated a culture of pluralism taking root.

Sri Lanka comprised three distinct kingdoms when the Portuguese landed in 1505. The British were the first to unify the island in 1815, and they made it a single administrative unit in 1833. Thus, it was British colonialism that cemented the island’s unitary structure.

Late 19th-century Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists added mytho-history to this arrangement and laid the groundwork for the ethnocentrism and majoritarianism that followed, although failed British promises played a role in influencing their actions.

For instance, Britain had promised to provide subventions to Buddhist institutions when it took command of the whole island, but failed to do so sufficiently. Instead, it tolerated and promoted Christian evangelicals who mocked and trivialized Buddhism, which over time only inspired Buddhist elites to become more protective of their identity and culture.11

British divide-and-rule policies also favoured Burghers—the mixed European and native population—and Tamils, partly because these groups were more conversant in English and were eager for government employment.

While the surfeit of minorities employed within the bureaucracy and Tamil demands especially for greater representation within legislative councils contributed to Sinhalese-Tamil tensions in the decades prior to independence, the smooth transfer of power justified the optimism many felt regarding Sri Lanka’s prospects.

The Sinhala-only movement, however, sundered this promise. This was a second pivot point away from pluralism.

IV. LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM

English continued to be the island’s official language following independence, despite only around 10% being conversant in it. Thus permits, licenses, petitions, telegrams, police complaints, and court proceedings were handled in a language most people did not fully comprehend.

This initially led to a swabasha (self-language) movement that called for both Sinhala and Tamil to replace English, and adoption of such a policy of linguistic parity would have precluded much of the ethnic animus that eventually took root.

The swabasha movement was rooted in principles of ethno-linguistic inclusion, but a counter-movement to make Sinhala the only official language, led by what came to be called the Pancha Maha Balawegaya (Five Great Forces—comprising Buddhist monks, workers, teachers, farmers, and physicians practising Ayurveda), gained prominence.

The consequences this counter-movement engendered led over time to Tamil separatism and civil war.

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), led by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, was the first to jump on the Sinhala-only bandwagon.

Solomon Bandaranaike was a leading UNP politician who broke away and formed the SLFP after realizing he was not going to succeed the party’s leader and first prime minister, D.S. Senanayake.12

He and the SLFP campaigned on a platform promoting linguistic parity in the 1952 election, but Bandaranaike opportunistically switched to Sinhala-only during the 1956 election campaign.13

He thereafter resorted to divisive rhetoric and claimed he would make Sinhala the only official language in 24 hours (and sometimes said he would do it in just 24 minutes) if elected prime minister.14

When the UNP belatedly realized that linguistic parity would cost the party the election, it too switched to Sinhala-only.

The two parties thereafter tried to outdo each other on who best could promote the majority community’s interests at the expense of the Tamil minority, leading to a process of ethnic outbidding that began empowering Sinhalese and marginalizing the hitherto relatively socio-economically “advanced” Tamils.15

This ethnic-outbidding process was, of course, exclusionary, but it is important to recognize that most SLFP and UNP elites who perpetrated it were hardly racist: they engaged in it mainly (if not solely) because they wanted to further their political aspirations.

In the context of the “hardware-software” metaphor, the Sri Lankan case is a good example of how the absence of minority constitutional and legal guarantees (i.e., weak “hardware”) allowed opportunistic elites to easily manipulate ethno-religious and cultural issues (i.e., “software”) so as to jettison any tendencies towards pluralism.

For instance, the year 1956 was also when Buddhists commemorated the 2,500th anniversary of Buddha’s death (Buddha Jayanthi).

It was Buddhist monks who recorded, preserved, and propagated Buddhist scriptures in the Pali language, and it was the transformation of Pali over the centuries that gave rise to modern Sinhala.

The Sinhala language is thus inextricably linked to Buddhism, and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and politicians easily, and effectively, combined language and religion to reiterate notions of Sinhadipa and Dhammadipa when clamouring for a Sinhala-only language policy.

Bandaranaike’s SLFP-led Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front) coalition handily won the April 1956 election, and the new government passed the Official Language Act of 1956 in June, making Sinhala the only official language.

Sinhalese mobs assaulted Tamils who were peacefully protesting the legislation outside Parliament, thus provoking the island’s first ever anti-Tamil riots.

Colvin R. de Silva, a leader in the LSSP, opposed the legislation by warning that “two torn little bleeding states may yet arise out of one little state” if the Tamil language was not accommodated;16 and the Communist Party’s Pieter Keuneman proved equally prescient by saying:

“Ten years from now it will be several times worse. This Bill is heading straight for the division of the country… Every order and regulation under it will be a cause for further strife.”17

The 1956 election was centred on Sinhala-only mobilization, and passage of the Official Language Act was a specific and very consequential pivot when pluralism was rejected and ethnocentrism rooted in linguistic nationalism institutionalized.

What is obvious is that political elites knew full well this monumental act of exclusion was bound to subvert democratic institutions and also likely to lead to “terror, anomie, and the violent call [by Tamils] for a separate state.”18 Yet, they went ahead anyway.

Buddhist nationalists, including the Buddhist clergy, partly clamoured for a Sinhala-only policy for cultural reasons, but average Sinhalese realized rightly that the policy would benefit them economically (through jobs within the government bureaucracy), just as politicians realized that they could use the language issue to attain and maintain power.

Solomon Bandaranaike, a liberal, made clear that he was manipulating the language issue for political purposes when he told an interviewer:

“I have never found anything to excite the people in quite the way this language issue does.”19

Consequently, nationalism aside, economics and politics played important roles in the Sinhala-only movement.

Seeking to tamp down simmering Tamil resentment, Bandaranaike and the Tamil Federal Party (FP) leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam negotiated the so-called Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact (B-C Pact) in July 1957, through which the Tamils agreed to jettison the demand for linguistic parity in exchange for Tamil being recognized as a minority language.

The government also agreed to set up regional councils to deal with education, agriculture, and Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas in the northeast.

This was clearly an attempt at inclusion, even while ensuring the Sinhalese stood to gain from the Official Language Act that had already passed.

The B-C Pact could have reversed the burgeoning ethnic tensions, but the UNP, which had staunchly supported linguistic parity almost until the end of the 1956 election campaign, now sought to make political mileage by joining the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and vociferously opposing the pact.

During this period especially, party politics oscillated between including, by promoting pluralism, and excluding Tamil linguistic aspirations, by promoting majoritarianism, but the process of ethnic outbidding ensured that majoritarianism triumphed.

Tamil politicians not belonging to the Federal Party did not help matters. Tamil leaders have rarely mounted a united front, and their bickering was on full display when those who did not belong to the FP vilified the agreement.

G.G. Ponnambalam, leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, claimed that the FP was seeking to relegate Tamils to an “inferior position” that was akin to a “local version of apartheid.”20

Chellappah Suntharalingam, among the first Tamils in Parliament to call for a separate Tamil state, likewise branded the FP and Tamils favouring the agreement “cowards.”21

Tamils, given their overrepresentation in the military, bureaucracy, and education sectors, had become used to thinking of themselves as a dominant community even though they were a minority.22

And given that they had joined with Sinhalese elites to ensure a smooth transfer of power in 1948, they rightly felt betrayed.

Yet, their opposition to the B-C Pact was unrealistic given the island’s demographics and Solomon Bandaranaike’s election victory.

Their vitriol merely provided support for Sinhalese extremists who were determined to fully exclude Tamils from helping to govern the island.

When another bout of anti-Tamil riots broke out in March and April 1958—after Tamils began protesting against state-owned buses using Sinhala lettering on number plates—Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike acceded to his opponents and abandoned the B-C Pact, tearing up a copy of the agreement in front of cheering Buddhist monks.23

A Tamil parliamentarian captured the prevalent zeitgeist of ethnic outbidding when he asserted that:

“People who have never been communalists have become communalists, and those who have been moderates have become extremists while extremists have become incorrigible fanatics.”24

Otherwise put, the B-C Pact would have helped alter the country’s weak “hardware,” as represented by the post-colonial Constitution, and thereby promoted pluralism.

But elite manipulation of the country’s “software,” in the form of ethno-religious passions, prevented this from happening. It was a scenario that kept repeating itself.

For instance, in August 1958, Prime Minister Bandaranaike managed to get the Tamil Language (Special Provision) Act No. 28 passed, which was geared towards enabling the reasonable use of Tamil for correspondence with government departments, administration of the predominantly Northern and Eastern Provinces, and in civil service examinations and educational programs.

Here then was another attempt at inclusion, and had the Act been seriously implemented, it is possible the burgeoning ethnic animus could have been halted.

But a Buddhist monk assassinated the Prime Minister in September 1959, and the SLFP government (1960–65), headed by Solomon Bandaranaike’s widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, refused to pass necessary regulations to implement the Act.

The requisite regulations were only approved in January 1966 under a UNP government headed by Dudley Senanayake, the son of D.S. Senanayake.

This time it was the SLFP that opposed the regulations, and the LSSP and CP, both of which had stoutly defended linguistic parity until the early 1960s, joined them.

This UNP government under Dudley Senanayake (1965–70) did try to accommodate Tamils’ other language demands through the so-called Dudley Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact (or D-C Pact) of 1965, which would have recognized the Northern and Eastern Provinces as Tamil-speaking and given the Tamils first preference when colonizing lands in the east.

Here, then, was yet another attempt at inclusion and it, like the B-C Pact, could have belatedly clamped down on Tamil discrimination that by then was spreading across government establishments.

Virulent opposition, however, mounted by the SLFP, LSSP, CP, and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists scuttled the attempt.

This blockage was another example of the culture of ethnic outbidding that had been institutionalized, and it signaled that a Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated government (often termed an ethnocracy) was in store.

Throughout these years, Tamils protested and resorted to satyagraha (passive resistance).

They flew black flags when the Sinhala Only Act was passed and made stirring speeches in Parliament. But they had little to show for it.

Indeed, moderate Tamils were not only humiliated when agreements with Sinhalese leaders (like the B-C and D-C Pacts) were jettisoned, but less compromising Tamils within and outside Parliament also ridiculed them.

Language, to a great degree, defines culture. In a polyethnic setting, it also shapes socio-economic opportunity.

Consequently, making Sinhala the sole official language not only challenged Tamils’ right to celebrate and thrive within their culture, it also stood to negatively affect their economic and social success, especially in education and employment.

And this is precisely what ensued after Sirimavo Bandaranaike took over the SLFP in 1960.

In going well beyond trying to fully implement the Sinhala-only policy (which took effect on 1 January 1961), the blatantly ethnocentric policies of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s two governments (1960–65 and 1970–77) further undermined pluralism and goaded Tamils towards separatist mobilization.

VI. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SOFT-AUTHORITARIANISM

With the Sinhalese being a clear majority, it was too easy for ambitious politicians to manipulate ethnic sentiments when seeking elected office.

But democracy necessitates inclusion, and how a country treats minorities is one important determinant of its democratic credentials.

Countries like India may have had no choice in accommodating minorities, given India’s ethnic tapestry.

Others like Canada and Belgium, despite lacking as complex an ethnic diversity, recognized multiple identities and set up institutions that permitted multiculturalism and civic nationalism.

Sri Lanka’s leaders went out of their way to do the opposite, and in the process also undermined the liberal democracy that was well within the island’s grasp.

Ethnocentrism and ethnic conflict trivialize the liberal tenets undergirding democracy.

This is because civil wars especially privilege narratives rooted in security, territoriality, and sovereignty, and thereby deemphasize individual, civil, political, and group rights.

In this context, those seen to be operating against the state are the ones most affected.

In the Sri Lankan case, the majority Sinhalese initially put up with myriad anti-democratic practices the state directed at Tamils because they, as a community, benefitted from such practices and were least affected by the counter-terror activities the state mounted against the LTTE and its perceived supporters.

Yet, illiberalism cannot be compartmentalized, and the policies used to intimidate and control Tamils eventually were directed at all Sri Lankans as the country hurtled towards authoritarianism.42

For instance, one of the first pieces of legislation the government passed to counter Tamil separatism was the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1978, which allowed the security forces to arrest, detain without trial, and keep incommunicado for 18 months anyone suspected of promoting terrorism.

Scores of innocent Tamils got caught in its dragnet, and this legislation together with the 1983 riots may have done more to radicalize Tamils than all the previous anti-minority policies put together.

The state of emergency that was continuously imposed also allowed the armed forces and Tamil rebels to operate in grotesque ways.

Tit-for-tat attacks targeting innocent Tamil and Sinhalese villagers and Buddhist clergy saw hundreds murdered.43

Dispassionate and unbiased governance is a hallmark of democracy, but the ethnocentrism successive governments had facilitated undermined impartial institutions and any approach to pluralism—because Parliament, the bureaucracy, the military, educational institutions, and the courts were all operating within an ethnic prism.

The fear psychosis and culture of revenge the civil war promoted hardened attitudes and further exacerbated this situation.

The no-holds-barred attitude the government and security forces adopted was easily justified as a response to the LTTE’s modus operandi.

The group had attacked and co-opted other Tamil rebel organizations so as to claim sole representative status for the Tamils and embarked on a murderous strategy to create eelam (a separate Tamil state).

It assassinated anti-LTTE Tamils; perfected suicide bombing and influenced other terrorist groups; killed numerous military and political leaders, including President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993; assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991; resorted to extortion within and outside Sri Lanka; forcibly recruited children into its forces; evicted over 60,000 Muslims from Northern Province; and used civilians as human shields.

In the process of trying to set up eelam, the LTTE sought to transform Tamil life in some positive ways; they, however, ended up transmogrifying the community.44

As The Economist aptly put it, the LTTE were ultimately:

“as vicious and totalitarian a bunch of thugs as ever adopted terrorism as a national liberation struggle.”45

Successive attempts at ceasefires and conflict resolution failed because the LTTE were never serious about settling for any solution short of eelam and the Sri Lankan government was never committed to meaningful devolution.

An aggrieved and nationalist Tamil diaspora pitted against equally committed Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists only fanned the ethnic flames.

For instance, India-brokered talks in Thimphu in July–August 1985 led to Tamil rebel groups making four principal demands:

• Tamils to be recognized as a distinct nation;
• The northeast designated as their historical homeland;
• Tamils allowed the right to self-determination; and
• All Tamils granted Sri Lankan citizenship.

The latter was in response to the plight of Indian Tamils, many of whom had shifted to Northern Province, particularly following the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom.

The Sri Lankan government refused to accept the conditions, and ongoing violence between rebel groups and government forces during the discussions (despite a ceasefire having been agreed to) caused the Thimpu talks to collapse.

Similarly, attempts by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to promote federalism and create a new constitution also failed in 2000, partly due to LTTE and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist intransigence, but also due to opposition within her own People’s Alliance coalition and the UNP playing spoiler.

The Norwegian-sponsored peace process during 2000–06 also failed because both sides refused to compromise, and the LTTE especially violated its terms with abandon.46

These failed processes make clear how important timing can be.

The more the Sinhalese–Tamil conflict intensified, the more uncompromising people on both sides became.

The most serious attempt to deal with devolution and put an end to the conflict took place in 1987, but the ham-handed and overbearing Indian involvement that accompanied this effort also internationalized and further complicated the civil war.

Indeed, geopolitical and regional considerations were increasingly shaping the Sri Lankan story.

A government military offensive in May–June 1987 to capture territory in the Jaffna Peninsula led to Indian involvement.

The timing coincided with Sri Lanka’s tilt towards the West, even as the so-called “Indira Doctrine” influenced Indian geopolitics.

This stance suggested India’s security considerations were co-terminous with what took place throughout South Asia, and South Asian states should therefore avoid regional and international entanglements that were inimical to Indian interests; and that India could also not disregard the plight of extraterritorial minorities with ties to ethnic groups in India as the resulting dynamics inevitably affected it.47

The 1971 Pakistan civil war that led to the creation of Bangladesh no doubt influenced this position, although Sri Lanka’s tilt towards the West caused its amplification during the early 1980s.
President Jayewardene’s attempts to cozy up to the West without regard for Indian security concerns,48 and the sour relations between him and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, had led India to secretly arm and train Tamil rebels in the 1980s.49

When it appeared the May–June 1987 military offensive was likely to crush Tamil militants, pressure from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu caused Gandhi’s son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, to impose on the Sri Lankan government and LTTE the 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accords, which called for the LTTE to give up their weapons and for Sri Lanka to institute devolution.

The effort failed.

The LTTE ended up fighting the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) that was stationed in the northeast, in what turned out to be India’s longest war.

The Sri Lankan government did pass the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which led to provincial councils and the Northern and Eastern Provinces being merged, but the IPKF presence led to much hostility against India and caused Jayewardene’s successor, Ranasinghe Premadasa, to demand that the Force leave the island.

Some IPKF personnel had acted in a predatory fashion against Tamil civilians, and the Force was equally unpopular among both Tamils and Sinhalese when it left in March 1990.50

However, the IPKF presence had helped the government scotch a second violent uprising by the JVP because the Sri Lankan forces did not have to battle Tamil rebels in the north and JVP rebels in the south at the same time.

The provincial councils, which were designed to address Tamils’ grievances by devolving some powers to regions, ended up operating throughout Sri Lanka (except the predominantly war-torn Tamil northeast).

Moreover, elections for the Northern Provincial Council were only held in September 2013 after much international pressure was brought to bear on the Sri Lankan government.

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists had vociferously opposed the Indo-Lanka Peace Accords and its attendant IPKF presence and northeast merger.

The nationalists were especially opposed to the 13th Amendment granting powers over police and land to the provinces.

The Sri Lanka Supreme Court upheld the 13th Amendment soon after it was passed, but in 2006 ruled that the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was invalid.51

While this still meant that the provinces controlled police and land powers, in reality these, and all other powers vested in the provinces, are regulated by the central government.52

The Provincial Councils, had they been allowed to operate as per the 13th Amendment, might have satisfied most Tamils, especially after it became clear that the LTTE quest for separatism was headed for a dead end.

But successive governments have preferred to operate in paternalistic and centripetal fashion when dealing with provinces, and the suggestion that empowered Northern and Eastern Provinces (the latter where Tamils and Muslims constitute a clear majority) could promote separatism and undermine the island’s unitary state status has also precluded the predominantly Sinhalese provinces from asserting themselves.

Today, parties and politicians at the national level not only often dictate how provincial budgets, which the national government allocates, get spent, they also use the provincial councils to appoint supporters as councillors, despite this being the purview of provincial leaders.

Disempowering provincial councils was taken to new heights under the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, which came to power in November 2005 and catapulted the country towards authoritarianism.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa gets credit for having defeated the LTTE, which many military experts predicted was not possible.

The controversial manner in which his government and military did so, however, has led to accusations of war crimes.

Given his longstanding and solid Sinhalese Buddhist credentials, Rajapaksa could have easily used the victory over the LTTE to pursue measures that accommodated some Tamil grievances.

He instead pursued policies that further marginalized minorities, including Muslims who had been anti-LTTE and opposed to separatism, even as he sought to create a political dynasty rooted in soft authoritarianism.53

On the authoritarian front, Rajapaksa, and what came to be called the “First Family,” controlled nearly 70% of the country’s budget even as they used various tactics (bribing, engineering defections, ordering investigations, and ensuring negative media coverage) to keep opposition weak.

They undermined institutions (especially Parliament and courts) so as to arrogate power within the executive branch and among family members; resorted to unfair election practices (including pre-election rigging); muzzled the independent media, which led to self-censorship; terrorized civil society; widened surveillance of opponents; expanded state and family influence in the private sector (especially banks and finance companies); and allowed the regime’s supporters to engage in corruption and sexual predation with impunity.

He had Sarath Fonseka, the former army commander who designed the war strategy to defeat the LTTE, arrested in humiliating fashion and thereafter court-martialed on flimsy grounds in retaliation for running against him in the 2010 presidential election.

He likewise orchestrated the impeachment of the very first female Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after she rendered an unfavourable decision.54

While all this directly impacted democracy and good governance, the regime’s attempts to militarize the country, and use Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism to destabilize the northeast and target Muslims, especially undermined whatever hopes there were for reviving pluralism in a post-conflict setting.

Consequently, as opposed to returning lands that had been taken over to set up camps and High Security Zones in the northeast, the Rajapaksa government went on building even more camps post-war, and also constructed military-administered hotels and guesthouses.

The lack of demobilization and increased militarization saw soldiers operating tea shops and barber salons in Tamil areas (principally along the A-9 highway connecting the north and south), working on military-run farms that were created using state lands and Tamil-owned properties (while many landowners languished as part of the internally displaced), and running tourist and business ventures the private sector had hitherto overseen.

A rigorous surveillance system in the northeast saw military personnel attending all functions, especially in Tamil villages.
Global Centre for Pluralism
Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
rehabilitated LTTE cadres were also used to
monitor village activities. A Presidential Task
Force, superintended by President Rajapaksa’s
brother Basil, controlled all development in
Northern Province (with NGOs and donor
agencies repeatedly prevented from carrying
out vital programs). The Tamil version of the
the national anthem was banned. Cemeteries the
LTTE had erected to commemorate its dead were
f
lattened and military barracks built over them in
some instances. Buddhist pagodas and military
monuments celebrating victory over the LTTE
were conspicuously built along northern roads in
ways smacking of Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony,
while Buddhist monks were provided with land
to set up temples in some locales, and Buddha
statues and bo (ficus religiosa) trees erected in
certain Tamil and Muslim villages in the northeast
so as to brand these regions Buddhist (even
though in many instances no Buddhists lived
there). Furthermore, Sinhalese colonization of
Tamil areas was encouraged (a policy that various
governments had facilitated especially in Eastern
Province since independence), streets and villages
in the northeast were provided Sinhalized names,
and water and other resources in the east rationed
in ways to create tension between Tamils and
Muslims.
All this ensued as rumors spread that Tamil
women recruited to work on military-run farms
were engaged in illicit affairs and prostitution
and the widespread use of alcoholism, drugs,
and pornography throughout Tamil communities
caused anomie and ruptured families; periodic
claims of a LTTE recrudescence led to search
and detention operations that kept Tamils
scared and discombobulated; and the two ex
military governors of Northern and Eastern
Provinces operated as if their primary goal was
to try and ensure that Tamils were kept hopeless
and prostrate.55 In the early 1960s, Sirimavo
Bandaranaike’s Permanent Secretary for Defense
and External Affairs, N.Q. Dias, had called for
military bases to be set up throughout Northern
Province so as to pacify and control Tamils, and
the Rajapaksa government’s policies decades later
were rooted within this mentality. The speed with
which this transformation took place caused many
among the Tamil community to claim that the
government was overseeing a policy of “cultural
genocide.”56
With the Sri Lankan Tamils having embraced
separatism, the Tamil-speaking Muslims were
long considered the “good minority.” They too
paid a heavy price during the ethnic conflict,
however, since the LTTE targeted Muslims in the
northeast and evicted all Muslims from Northern
Province. During the civil war, a number of
Muslims used their links to the east and worked
as government intelligence operatives; and
Muslim politicians consistently lobbied Muslim
and Middle Eastern countries on behalf of Sri
Lanka. The community was nonetheless stunned
when mobs led by Buddhist monks destroyed a
300 year-old Muslim shrine in September 2011.
A longstanding mosque in Dambulla, a prominent
Buddhist pilgrimage site, was attacked in April

Three months later the blatantly racist,
anti-Islamic (and anti-Christian) Bodu Bala Sena
(Buddhist Power Force, BBS) was launched,
which thereafter led to regular attacks against
Muslims, their properties and mosques, even as
18 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
Global Centre for Pluralism
Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka the police looked on. The most serious attack took place in June 2014 in Dharga Town, a Muslim
enclave south of Colombo, when mobs supported
by police commandos killed two Muslims, and
destroyed dozens of homes and other property.57
The BBS enjoyed links to the Rajapaksa family,
and this enabled it to orchestrate violence against
Muslims and their properties with impunity.58
The group combined notions of Ranaviru, anseniormostinhadipa and
dhammadipa with post-9/11 Islamophobia, and
liaised with Burma-Myanmar’s 969 Movement
led by the firebrand monk Ashin Wirathu, who has
led violent campaigns against Muslims there. The
BBS has claimed that Muslim fundamentalists
seek to transform Sri Lanka into an “Arabian
country,” and thereby justified its campaign
to ban halal products, the construction of new
mosques using funds from the Middle East and
women wearing the niqab. It has further claimed
that Muslim employers seek to seduce Sinhalese
women and that Muslim stores sell special
underwear designed to make Sinhalese women
sterile. Reading the publications and listening
to them shows that groups like the BBS are
obsessed with demographics and their vilification
of Muslims appears to borrow a page from the
equally communal-minded Hindutva forces in
India.
The first major ethnic riots in Sri Lanka took
place in 1915 between Sinhalese and Muslims,
and many Muslims feared that the BBS and its
supporters were bent on commemorating the
event in 2015. Given the well-calibrated attack
in Dharga Town, and that Muslims mobilized to
vote against President Rajapaksa in the January
2015 presidential election, there was every reason
to believe that a Rajapaksa victory would have
cataclysmic consequences for the community.
But Rajapaksa lost, with both Muslims and
Tamils playing a major role in his defeat. And his
attempts to make a comeback as prime minister
via the August 2015 parliamentary elections also
fell flat.59 His defeat not only allowed the island’s
minorities to breathe easier; it also provided the
country’s new leaders the chance to institute
policies promoting pluralism, although Sri
Lanka is most unlikely to become a prototype for
pluralism in the developing world.
VII. THE POTENTIAL FOR
CHANGE
Giving into international pressure, President
Rajapaksa had appointed the Lessons Learned and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in May 2010
to investigate the civil war from February 2002,
when the final ceasefire agreement with the LTTE
took effect, to May 2009, when the actual conflict
ended. The Commission’s report was strong
on reconciliation and weak on accountability,
but it concluded that, “the root cause of the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of
successive Governments to address the genuine
grievances of the Tamil people” and insisted
that a political solution to address the causes
of the conflict was “imperative.”60 Rajapaksa
not only cavalierly disregarded the LLRC’s
recommendations, but crossed swords with the
international community regarding alleged war
crimes committed by the government and military.
19
Global Centre for Pluralism
Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
President Maithripala Sirisena’s 2015 victory
over Rajapaksa has led to a greater willingness
to deal with issues of accountability, although no
one expects government and military personnel
who oversaw and conducted the violence against
Tamils towards the final stages of the war to
face stiff penalties. With the LTTE leadership
responsible for war crimes eliminated, there is
no political will among the majority Sinhalese to
see soldiers, widely considered to be ranawiruwo
(war heroes), held responsible for their crimes.
It is easily observed that many Sinhalese believe
that Tamils, having supported the LTTE, have
received their just comeuppance. Thus, for
example, Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, Sri Lankan
president from May 1993 to November 1994,
could say that Sri Lanka had no ethnic problem—
it only had a terrorist problem.61 This mindset
makes achieving full-fledged accountability for
crimes committed during the civil war politically
impossible.
Since coming to power in January 2015, the
Sirisena government has adopted some policies
to address Tamils’ grievances: it replaced the
ex-military governors in the north and east with
respected civil service personnel; appointed
the Tamil who was the senior most Supreme
Court justice as Chief Justice; supported the
Tamil National Alliance, which was vilified as
the LTTE’s proxy during the war, becoming the
main opposition in Parliament and its leader
becoming the leader of the opposition; returned
some military-held lands in the north and east to
civilians; released a number of Tamil prisoners
held over long periods; instituted an Office of
National Unity and Reconciliation under former
President Chandrika Kumaratunga; set up an
Office of Missing Persons; and has promised to
create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and Office of Reparations in response to the
UN Human Rights Council resolution Sri
Lanka cosponsored in September 2015. The
government also hopes to change the Constitution
and electoral system, and it is possible that
attempts will be made to accommodate some
of the Tamils’ major grievances in the process.
But with majoritarianism now embedded, no
politician among the Sinhalese seriously considers
federalism an option. Similarly, the idea of self
determination is considered code for separatism
and there will not be any language to this effect
going forward. The best the Tamils can expect is
some devolution, within a unitary state structure.
This is to say that whatever inclusion gets
instituted, it will be minimal and not affect the
extant majoritarian setup.
Today, Tamils’ most immediate demands center
on four issues: having lands taken over by
the military returned; getting the military to
demobilize, especially in the Northern Province;
ensuring accountability for those killed and
disappeared; and receiving reparations for
property and lives lost. Along with this, the vast
majority in the northeast clamour for dependable
employment, decent education for their children
and a safe climate to carry out their livelihoods.
Issues of federalism and devolution, while not
unimportant, are far from their minds. This seems
to be lost among some in the Tamil Diaspora,
who propagate unrealistic demands and rhetoric,
making it easy for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists
to harp on the LTTE bogey and obstruct necessary
reforms rooted in pluralism.
20 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
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Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
While political parties and leaders have alternated
in power in post-independence Sri Lanka,
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism has consistently
triumphed, and this at the expense of pluralism
and democracy. Instituting pluralism, and thereby
trying to regain the island’s democratic promise,
necessitates accepting and learning from the
mistakes committed. Yet, the communal trajectory
that post-independence Sri Lanka adopted has
emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists,
whose longstanding zeitgeist is rooted in notions of
sinhadipa, dhammadipa and the attendant belief
that majority domination and minority subjugation
is fully justified.
Such is the majoritarianism governing the Sinhalese
Buddhist cosmos in Sri Lanka. Consequently, one
is unlikely to see the sort of pluralism befitting a
liberal democracy taking root on the island. The best
one can hope for at the moment is limited pluralism
where minorities live with a sense of security and
dignity.
VIII. SRI LANKA AND THE
DRIVERS OF PLURALISM
The literature on path dependency makes clear
how timing and sequence of policies shape
political processes and how seemingly relatively
unimportant events can snowball and lead to
movements of great consequence.62 In this
context, one can speculate whether Sri Lanka’s
ethno-religious and political trajectory would
have been much different had the Constitution
left by Britain’s Soulbury Commission instituted
minority rights in the form of a bill of rights,
or had the Soulbury Constitution allowed for
meaningful devolution, or had D.S. Senanayake
not died when he did, or had the B-C Pact and
even the D-C Pact been institutionalized, or
had J.R. Jayewardene used his supermajority in
Parliament to ram through policies that rectified
prior governments’ practices. In short, Sri
Lanka did have many opportunities to change
the island’s “hardware” and thereby control the
manner in which ethno-religious and cultural
sentiments were fanned (i.e., how its “software”
operated). But Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism
rooted in mytho-history, British shortsightedness,
misplaced and displaced trust among elites,
political opportunism, and the hardening of
attitudes as ethnic tensions transmogrified into
terrorism and war crimes ensured this did not
happen. The reality in Sri Lanka is that while
governments may promote policies supporting
pluralism, this will only take place in ways that do
not threaten the majoritarianism now in place.
Utilizing the above narrative, the following are
the ways in which the four drivers associated with
Governance and Diversity in this project have
contributed to Sri Lanka’s failure to institute
pluralism.
Livelihoods and well-being

• Tamil over-representation in bureaucracy,
  military and university system (partly stemming
  from colonial policies) empowered them socio
  economically in ways that upset Sinhalese.
• Excluding Indian Tamils (disenfranchising them)
  negated their ability to utilize the political process
  21
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  when seeking to better their livelihoods.
• Making Sinhala the only national language and
  using it to increase Sinhalese Buddhists in the
  bureaucracy excluded Tamils from the state sector.
• Instituting a quota system and forcing Tamils
  to score higher for university entry lowered
  opportunities for their socio-economic progress.

Enabling anti-Tamil riots that destroyed homes and businesses and directly undermined livelihoods.
Law, politics and recognition

• The Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
  disenfranchised Indian Tamils.
• Passing the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956
  (Sinhala Only Act) began the process of excluding
  Tamils at various levels.
• Anti-Tamil riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 (in
  Jaffna) and especially the pogrom in July 1983.
• Failure to institute the Bandaranaike
  Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957.
• Failure to institute the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam
  Pact of 1965.

Passing the 1972 Constitution without any input
from minorities and providing Buddhism foremost
status and declaring Sri Lanka a unitary state.

• Banning the JVP following the 1971 insurrection
  and also following the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom.
• Passing the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1978
  that led to many innocent Tamils being imprisoned
  and tortured.
• The July 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accords that led
  to 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which set
  up the provincial council system and merged the
  Northern and Eastern province into a single unit.

The 2007 Supreme Court ruling that demerged the
northeast into two provinces and the consistent
opposition to any meaningful devolution.

• Provincial councils being undermined by
  centripetal governance.
  Citizens, civil society and identity
• Mytho-history, including notions of sihadipa and
  dhammadipa.
• Elements of civil society that was more “bonding”
  or exclusive (including individuals from same
  group) than “bridging” or inclusive (including
  individuals from a variety of groups).

The fascistic nature of the LTTE and its impact on those who lived in the territories it controlled.

• The various policies of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike governments that made the country more of an ethnocracy than a democracy.
• The Mahinda Rajapaksa government opposing the national anthem being sung in Tamil and the various other ways in which it sought to dominate and humiliate Tamils. The Maithripala Sirisena government now trying to introduce reforms that are conducive to good governance and pluralism.
• Minorities being forced to deal with a mainly Sinhalized bureaucracy, especially in areas outside of the northeast.
  Regional and transnational influences The state of Tamil Nadu in India and its influence
  on the Indian central government when

promoting the interests of Sri Lanka’s Tamils
(including Indian Tamils).

• J.R. Jayewardene pursuing close ties with the West
  (especially the United States) and the way this
  22 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  effected Indo-Lanka relations.
• India secretly arming and training Tamil rebels in
  the 1980s.
• The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord partly setting up the
  provincial council system.
• The Indian Peace Keeping Force being stationed
  in the island in the late 1980s and the war that
  ensured between the IPKF and LTTE.
• Sri Lanka’s closer ties to the Chinese during the
  Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency.
• International pressure on Sri Lanka to pursue
  accountability for alleged war crimes and post-war
  reconciliation with Tamils.
  23
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  NOTES
  1 Neil DeVotta (2004), Blowback: Linguistic
  Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic
  Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford
  University Press).
  2 For the 1911 figures, see E.B. Denham (1912),
  Ceylon at the Census of 1911 (Colombo:
  Government Printer), 196, 245. For the other
  f
  igures, see Department of Census and Statistics
  Sri Lanka, “Census of Population and Housing
  2012,” 20–1, accessed 26 January 2017, http://
  statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.
  php?fileName=Key_E&gp=Activities&tpl=3.
  3 See H. Kumarasingham, ed. (2015), The
  Road to Temple Trees: Sir Ivor Jennings and
  the Constitutional Development of Ceylon:
  Selected Writings (Colombo: Center for Policy
  Alternatives).
  4 I.D.S. Weerawardana (1960), Ceylon General
  Election 1956 (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena), 87.
  5 Howard W. Wriggins (1961), “Impediments
  to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon,”
  American Political Science Review 55:2 (June),
  316.
  6 See Kumarasingham, xxii–xxv.
  7 See Sharada Nayak (2014), The Raj Agent in
  Ceylon 1936–40 (New Delhi: Education Resources
  Center Trust).
  8 The Estate Tamils continue to be among the
  most marginalized in Sri Lanka; and many of
  their local leaders feel the government and estate
  owners conspire to keep the community socio
  economically disempowered so as to ensure a
  cheap labour force for the tea industry. Author
  interviews (2013), in Hatton and Nuwara Eliya,
  July. Also see Daniel Bass (2012), Everyday
  Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: Up-country Tamil Identity
  Politics (New York: Routledge).
  9 See Steven Kemper (1991), The Presence of
  the Past: Chronicles, Politics and Culture in
  Sinhala Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press);
  Gananath Obeyesekere (1997), “The Vicissitudes
  of the Sinhala-Buddhist identity through Time
  and Change,” in Sri Lanka: Collective Identities
  Revisited, vol. 1, edited by Michael Roberts
  (Colombo: Marga Institute); H.L. Seneviratne
  (1999), The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism
  in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago
  Press); Stanley J. Tambiah (1992), Buddhism
  Betrayed?: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri
  Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Neil
  DeVotta (2007), “Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist
  Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict
  Resolution in Sri Lanka,” Policy Studies no. 40
  (Washington D.C.: East-West Center).
  10 Quoted in Roshan Peiris (1996), “Rahula Hits
  Back,” Sunday Times (Colombo), 5 May, accessed
  26 January 2017, http://www.sundaytimes.
  lk/970921/news2.html.
  11 Kitsiri Malalgoda (1976), Buddhism in Sinhalese
  Society, 1750–1900: A Study of Religious Revival
  and Change (Berkeley: University of California
  Press).
  24 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  12 This is because D.S. Senanayake was seeking to
  promote his son Dudley Senanayake to succeed
  him.
  13 James Manor (1989), The Expedient Utopian:
  Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Durham, N.C.: Duke
  University Press).
  14 “‘I’ll Do It in 24 Minutes’ Now Says Mr.
  Bandaranaike,” Ceylon Daily News, 15 January
  1956, 5.
  15 Donald Horowitz considers ethnic groups that
  have “benefitted from opportunities in education
  and non-agricultural employment” to be
  “advanced.” Given that the predominantly Tamil
  Northern Province ranks low in terms of economic
  productivity (mainly due to its arid climate),
  Horowitz classified Tamils as an advanced group
  in a backward region. See Donald Horowitz
  (1984), Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
  University of California Press), 233.
  16 Quoted in House of Representatives (1956),
  Parliamentary Debates, 14 June, col. 1917.
  17 Quoted in House of Representatives (1956), col.
  1711.
  18 Seneviratne, 204.
  19 Quoted in Manor, vi.
  20 See “F.P. Acceptance of Sinhala Act Ignominious,”
  Ceylon Daily News, 4 September 1957, 11; “More
  Reactions to the Outcome of P.M.-F.P. Talks,”
  Ceylon Daily News, 27 July 1957, 3.
  21 House of Representatives (1957), Parliamentary
  Debates, vol. 30, col. 1271.
  22 As K.M. De Silva has noted, the ethnic conflict
  that ensued was one between “a majority with
  a minority complex, and a minority with a…
  majority complex.” See K.M. De Silva (1998),
  Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic
  Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Penguin Books),
  304.
  23 For a good account of these anti-Tamil riots, see
  Tarzie Vittachi (1958), Emergency ’58: The Story
  of the Ceylon Race Riots (London: A. Deutsch).
  24 Quoted in House of Representatives (1958),
  Parliamentary Debates, 20 November, col. 1747.
  25 S. Sivanayagam (1991), “The Phenomenon of
  Tamil Militancy,” in Sri Lankan Crisis and India’s
  Response, edited by V. Suryanarayan (New Delhi:
  Patriot Publishers), 40.
  26 Nigel Harris (1990), National Liberation
  (London: I.B. Tauris), 222.
  27 Harris (1990), 221.
  28 Chandra R. De Silva (1984), “Sinhala-Tamil
  Relations and Education in Sri Lanka: The
  University Admissions Issue—The First Phase,
  1971–77,” in From Independence to Statehood:
  Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and
  Asian States, edited by Robert B. Goldman and
  A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (New York: St. Martin’s
  Press), 125–46; Neelan Tiruchelvam (1984),
  “Ethnicity and Resource Allocation,” in From
  25
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic
  Conflict in Five African and Asian States, edited
  by Robert B. Goldman and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
  (New York: St. Martin’s Press),185–95; Patrick
  Peebles (1990), “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict
  in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian
  Studies 49:1 (February): 30–55; A. Theva Rajan
  (1995), Tamil As Official Language: Retrospect
  and Prospect (Colombo: International Center for
  Ethnic Studies); Ambalavanar Sivarajah (1996),
  Politics of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka (New
  Delhi: South Asian Publishers); M.R. Narayan
  Swamy (1994), Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to
  Guerrillas (Delhi: Konark); A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
  (2000), Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its
  Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and
  Twentieth Centuries (Vancouver: University of
  British Columbia Press).
  29 The demand was most forcefully articulated in
  the May 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution and July
  1977 manifesto of the Tamil United Liberation
  Front, a political grouping comprised of multiple
  Tamil parties that won all Northern Province
  constituencies in the 1977 parliamentary elections.
  30 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (1994), S.J.V.
  Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan
  Tamil Nationalism, 1947–77 (Honolulu:
  University of Hawaii Press), 115.
  31 Satchi Ponnambalam (1983), Sri Lanka: The
  National Question and the Tamil Liberation
  Struggle (London: Zed Books), 174.
  32 Bradman Weerakoon (2004), Rendering unto
  Caesar: A Fascinating Story of One Man’s Tenure
  under Nine Prime Ministers and Presidents of Sri
  Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications), 127.
  33 Rohan Edirisinha and N. Selvakkumaran (2000),
  “The Constitutional Evolution of Ceylon/Sri Lanka
  1948–98,” in Sri Lanka’s Development Since
  Independence: Socio-Economic Perspectives and
  Analyses, edited by W.D. Lakshman and A. Tisdell
  (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publications,
  Inc.), 103.
  34 For details, see Neil DeVotta (2014), “Parties,
  Political Decay, and Democratic Regression in
  Sri Lanka,” Commonwealth and Comparative
  Politics 52:1 (January): 139–65.
  35 For a good account of the attempt to make Sinhala
  the only national language in the colonial State
  Council see Jane Russell (1982), “Language,
  Education and Nationalism—the Language Debate
  of 1944,” Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social
  Studies 8:2, pp. 38–64.
  36 Bruce Matthews (1982), “District Development
  Councils in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 22:11
  (November): 117–34.
  37 Jagath P. Senaratne (1997), Political Violence
  in Sri Lanka, 1977–90: Riots, Insurrections,
  Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention
  (Amsterdam: VU University Press).
  38 When a group of businessmen that had advised
  Jayewardene’s election campaign visited him
  following the August 1977 anti-Tamil riots and
  warned against the anti-Tamil posturing of those
  in the government, he told one of them: “You are
  26 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
  Global Centre for Pluralism
  Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
  a lawyer; I am a politician. I need this [Tamil]
  problem for the survival of my party.” Author
  interview with Godwin Fernando, who was among
  those who went to see Jayewardene, 1 January

39 The low figure was the government estimate,
while others put the number killed around
2,000. See Patricia Hyndman (1988), Sri Lanka:
Serendipity Under Siege (Nottingham, UK:
Spokesman), 26.
40 See Newton Gunasinghe (1984), “The Open
Market and its Impact on Ethnic Relations in
Sri Lanka,” in Sri Lanka: The Ethnic Conflict:
Myths, Realities, and Perspectives, Committee
for Rational Development (New Delhi: Navrang),
197–214.
41 Gunasinghe (1984).
42 Neil DeVotta (2015), “From Counterterrorism to
Soft-Authoritarianism: The Case of Sri Lanka,”
in Critical Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism,
edited by Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (London:
Routledge), 210–30.
43 See Narayan Swamy (1994) and Wilson (2000).
44 Neil DeVotta (2009), “Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism
in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49:6 (November
December): 1021–51. Also see M.R. Narayan
Swamy (2003), Inside an Elusive Mind:
Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World’s
Most Ruthless Guerrilla Leader (Colombo: Vijitha
Yapa Publications).
45 “Truth and Consequences,” Economist, 30 April
2011, 46.
46 See Mark Salter (2015), To End a Civil War:
Norway’s Peace Engagement in Sri Lanka
(London: Hurst & Company).
47 S.D. Muni (1993), Pangs of Proximity: India’s
and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi:
Sage Publications); N.S. Jagannathan (1990),
“Anatomy of a Misadventure,” Mainstream 28:24,
p. 3.
48 Attempting to lease oil farms in Trincomalee
(in the northeast) to an American concern,
agreeing to host a powerful Voice of America
station, allowing the US aircraft carrier Kitty
Hawk to dock in Colombo in November 1985,
and recruiting Israel’s Shin Beth and Mossad and
Britain’s ex-Special Air Service commandos to
train Sri Lankan military personnel were among
issues that rankled India at a time when that
country was suspicious of especially US strategy
in the Indian Ocean.
49 See Narayan Swamy (1994).
50 For Indian involvement in Sri Lanka, see Muni
(1993); K.M. De Silva (1995), Regional Powers
and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka,
1977–90 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press); and P. Sahadevan and Neil DeVotta
(2006), Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri
Lanka (Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd.),
chapter 9.
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Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
51 Sri Lanka comprises of 25 districts and nine
provinces. Between 1987 and 2006 the island had
eight provinces due to the Northern and Eastern
Provinces being merged.
52 For details on the provincial councils, see Amita
Shastri (1992), “Sri Lanka’s Provincial Council
System: A Solution to the Ethnic Problem?,”
Asian Survey 32:8 (August): 723–43.
53 Hard authoritarian leaders rule by diktat, while
soft authoritarian rulers manipulate features of
democracy to maintain legitimacy even as they
undermine democratic institutions, the rule of law
and pluralism.
54 See Neil DeVotta (2011), “Sri Lanka: From
Turmoil to Dynasty,” Journal of Democracy
22:2 (April): 130–44; Jason G. Stone (2014), “Sri
Lanka’s Postwar Descent,” Journal of Democracy
25:2 (April): 146–57.
55 According to one NGO, the ex-military governor
of Northern Province went so far as to limit the
number of chickens that could be distributed to
destitute Tamil villages. Author interview with a
leading NGO official, Colombo, July 2013.
56 The information in this paragraph is based on
scores of interviews conducted throughout the
island between 2012 and 2015 with civil society
activists, NGO personnel, journalists, academics,
clergy members, labour leaders, and local and
national level politicians.
57 Farzana Haniffa (2016), “Stories in the Aftermath
of Aluthgama,” in Buddhist Extremists and
Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in
Contemporary Sri Lanka, edited by John Clifford
Holt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016),
164–93.
58 On at least one occasion, Muslim proprietors
who tried to file a court case against the BBS for
attacking their store were warned against doing
so by members of the Rajapaksa family. Author
interview, August 2013, Colombo.
59 For details pertaining to the January and August
2015 presidential and parliamentary elections,
respectively, see Neil DeVotta (2016), “A Win for
Democracy in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Democracy
27:1 (January): 152–66.
60 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons
Learnt and Reconciliation (2011), 291, http://
www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/
ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf.
61 Quoted in Asoka Bandarage (2009), The
Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism,
Ethnicity, Political Economy (London:
Routledge), 14.
62 See, for instance, Paul Pierson (2000),
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the
Study of Politics,” The American Political Science
Review 94:2 (June): 251–67.
28 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies
Global Centre for Pluralism
Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka
CASE AUTHOR
Neil DeVotta is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University.
His research interests include South Asian security and politics, ethnicity and nationalism, ethnic conflict
resolution, and democratic transition and consolidation.
Acknowledgements
The Centre gratefully acknowledges the collaboration of Will Kymlicka, of Queen’s University, Jane Jenson,
of the Université de Montréal, and the other members of our international research advisory group. The
Change Case Series was developed with generous support from the International Development
Research Centre.
This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre,
Ottawa, Canada.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of IDRC or its Board of Governors.
This analysis was commissioned by the Global Centre for Pluralism to generate global dialogue about the
drivers of pluralism. The specific views expressed herein are those of the author.
The Global Centre for Pluralism is an applied knowledge organization that facilitates dialogue, analysis
and exchange about the building blocks of inclusive societies in which human differences are respected.
Based in Ottawa, the Centre is inspired by Canadian pluralism, which demonstrates what governments and
citizens can achieve when human diversity is valued and recognized as a foundation for shared citizenship.
Please visit us at pluralism.ca
Global Centre for Pluralism
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Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies