The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 1)

Andrea Novellis

08/29/2024

As the 2024 elections approach in Sri Lanka, the National People’s Power (NPP) is positioning itself as a major contender. However, the JVP, the dominant party within the NPP, carries a legacy closely associated with Sinhala nationalism. This raises critical questions for voters, especially those from minority communities, about how the JVP now approaches the complex issue of ethnic relations. This analysis explores the JVP/NPP’s recent trajectory on this crucial topic, examining their past manifestos and public statements – key indicators of a party’s vision, values, and plans for the future – to determine whether they represent a coherent and genuine shift in ideology or a calculated political strategy. Analyzing these documents allows us to trace the evolution of the JVP/NPP’s approach to ethnic relations, providing valuable context for understanding their current position as Sri Lanka heads towards the 2024 elections. The JVP/NPP’s approach to ethnic relations will have profound implications for Sri Lanka’s future, making their stance a critical issue as the country heads towards the 2024 elections.

A history of mistrust

To grasp the complexities of the JVP’s current position on ethnic relations, it’s crucial to acknowledge their history. From its inception, the JVP was closely associated with Sinhala nationalism. This was especially apparent during Sri Lanka’s civil war, where the party fiercely opposed granting autonomy to Tamil regions. This position, along with their actions during the conflict, gave them a reputation for opposing Tamil self-determination – a legacy that still affects their relationship with the Tamil community.

The JVP opposed power sharing efforts like the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment, seeing them as threats to Sri Lankan unity. The party’s leader, Rohana Wijeweera, even went so far as to frame Tamil nationalism as a reactionary movement aligned with imperialist interests (Venugopal, 2010). This stance was not merely rhetorical; the JVP actively supported policies that ran counter to devolution, such as the legal separation of the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Even after renouncing violence and entering mainstream politics in the early 1990s, the JVP has struggled to shake off the perception of being fundamentally opposed to Tamil aspirations. Their past continues to haunt their present, making it challenging to build bridges with the Tamil community and raising questions about whether their commitment to inclusivity is genuine or merely a tactic for electoral gain.

From homogeneity to targeted recognition

A closer look at the JVP’s past manifestos and policy documents shows a gradual shift in how they approach ethnic issues. While still stressing national unity, they increasingly recognize Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and cultural makeup. However, this shift hasn’t been straightforward, and the party’s stance is often marked by ambiguity and conflicting signals.

Their 2015 manifesto, while light on specifics regarding ethnic relations, focused on uniting “our people” and solving “the problems faced by our people”. A closer examination, however, reveals a lack of specific proposals for addressing Tamil grievances or advancing power-sharing arrangements. While the manifesto touched upon the need for ethnic harmony and reconciliation, it largely avoided committing to concrete actions that might address the root causes of ethnic tensions. This lack of concrete engagement likely contributed to their modest performance in the 2015 elections, securing only 4.87% of the vote and failing to win any seats in the presidential election. The lack of support, especially from Tamil communities, highlighted the JVP’s struggle to appeal to voters beyond their traditional base.

The JVP’s 2019 manifesto showed a clear shift toward a more inclusive tone. It explicitly calls for a “Sri Lankan nation with equal recognition for Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, and other nationalities”. This suggests a move away from promoting a single, uniform national identity to recognizing the unique identities of different groups in Sri Lanka. The JVP even criticizes previous governments for fueling divisions between Tamil and Sinhala communities for political gain, presenting themselves as a party that can heal these rifts.

The 2019 manifesto took a more targeted approach by addressing the specific needs of different communities. It included separate sections for Tamil communities in the North and East, for upcountry plantation workers (mainly of Indian Tamil origin), and for the Muslim community. This shows they recognize that different groups have different needs and cannot be treated the same way. They even proposed practical steps like hiring Tamil speaking officials in the North and East to provide government services in Tamil, and setting up a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to look into violence against Muslims. They also committed to promoting trilingualism – the use of Sinhala, Tamil, and English – in government services and education, viewing Sri Lanka’s linguistic diversity as a positive factor. However, even with these efforts to promote inclusivity, the JVP-NPP didn’t perform well in the 2019 elections. The aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks created a focus on national security that overshadowed their message of unity.

The JVP’s English language newspaper also reflects this focus on shared economic struggles instead of directly addressing ethnic tensions. “Red Power” articles from 2020 to 2022, while talking about a unified Sri Lanka for everyone, often emphasize class conflict. The JVP presents itself as the only party that can bring real change, rescue the country from economic trouble, and resist outside influences[1]. They heavily criticize the government – both past and present – for being corrupt and abusing power, blaming these problems on capitalism[2]. They don’t talk much about specific ethnic concerns. Instead, they focus on criticizing “communalism,” which they see as a tactic used by power hungry politicians to exploit ethnic and religious differences[3]. This allows the JVP to present themselves as above ethnic divisions and focus on shared economic problems that affect everyone.

The JVP continued this move towards inclusivity in their 2021 “Rapid Response” booklet[4]. Campaigning as part of the National People’s Power (NPP), they called for a “new system of governance” that would give more power to local regions (NPP, 2021). They proposed making Provincial Councils stronger, which hints at giving more autonomy to different areas of the country. However, they still didn’t explicitly support federalism, a system where regions have a lot of self-governance.

The language of inclusion

The JVP’s changing views on language policy show their attempts to embrace inclusivity. The 2015 manifesto proposed trilingual education (Sinhala, Tamil, and English), suggesting an understanding of language as a key marker of identity and a potential tool for greater inclusion. This commitment to trilingualism was further emphasized in the 2019 manifesto, which advocated for ensuring citizens can access services and education in all national languages, promoting linguistic diversity as a strength. This commitment to trilingualism reflects a notable shift from their past, when the JVP’s rhetoric often presented the Sinhalese majority as victims of discriminatory policies, particularly regarding university admissions and employment opportunities (Venugopal, 2010).

The devolution dilemma

A major challenge for the JVP is their stance on devolution – giving more power to local regions. Historically, they strongly opposed the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which was supposed to do just that. They saw it as a step towards separatism and a risk to Sri Lanka’s unity. This made many Tamils see them as a party unwilling to share power. This history still affects them today, as they try to secure a majority at the elections without upsetting their Sinhalese nationalist supporters.

While their 2019 and 2021 manifestos acknowledge the distinct needs of Tamil communities and advocate for decentralization, they stop short of explicitly endorsing federalism or full implementation of the 13th Amendment, measures that many Tamil political actors view as essential for meaningful power-sharing. This balancing act is also seen in the JVP’s newspaper. “Red Power” articles, while calling for a united Sri Lanka with equal rights for everyone, often criticize “communalism.” They claim that powerful people use this tactic to divide communities and stay in power. This allows the JVP to appear as a party that’s above ethnic conflicts. But this approach might ignore the real issues faced by Tamil communities who have experienced discrimination and want more control over their own affairs. This is especially noticeable in “Red Power” articles from 2020 to 2022, where there is little mention of specific ethnic problems. By saying that both Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalism are just tricks used by the rich to divide working people, the JVP risks oversimplifying the complexities of the ethnic conflict and the grievances of the different groups.

Furthermore, the JVP’s own actions have sometimes contradicted their language of inclusivity. They have actively supported policies that run counter to devolution, such as the legal separation of the Northern and Eastern provinces. This gap between their words and actions reinforces the belief that the JVP remains tied to its Sinhala nationalist past. This dissonance is also evident in the contrast between NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s conciliatory approach and the hardline rhetoric of other senior members (Kotelawala, 2024). While Dissanayake has hinted at implementing the 13th Amendment, other senior members have boasted about the party’s role in defeating “separatist terrorism” and defending Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

This ambiguity raises questions about whether a genuine ideological shift is underway or if these are merely tactical maneuvers to appease different constituencies. This tension is particularly relevant considering the JVP’s limited success in attracting different constituencies in past elections, which underscores the challenges they face in breaking through the polarized political landscape.
Despite their efforts to present a strong leftist alternative that transcends ethnic divisions, the JVP’s past attempts have often been undermined by credibility issues and the pull of communal narratives that attracted their Sinhala base to other parties. Their manifestos show a gradual shift in rhetoric and policies, but their unclear stance on key issues like devolution and their struggle to reconcile their past with current goals remain challenges. As Sri Lanka approaches the 2024 elections, it remains to be seen whether the JVP can bridge the trust deficit with the Tamil community and convince voters that they are genuinely committed to building a unified and equitable nation.

[1] Red Power, Mar, Jul and Sep 2021

[2] Red Power, Mar, Jul, Nov and Dec 2021

[3] Red Power, Nov 2020

The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 1) – Groundviews

The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 2)

The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 2)

Andrea Novellis

08/30/2024

In Part 1, we explored the JVP’s evolving rhetoric and policies regarding ethnic relations, highlighting a shift from a more homogenous vision of Sri Lankan identity towards recognizing and accommodating diversity. However, this shift is not without its contradictions and limitations. This second part examines the persistent unclear positions surrounding their stance on devolution, the shadow cast by their history of armed struggle and the implications of their approach for the upcoming 2024 elections, particularly in the context of the transformative aragalaya protests.

The devolution dilemma: navigating a minefield

Devolution, the idea of giving more power to local regions, is a crucial issue for Tamil communities. The JVP’s stance on this issue shows how carefully they are trying to balance different interests. While advocating for greater regional autonomy, their commitment to meaningful power sharing remains ambiguous, particularly when it comes to embracing solutions that might alter the unitary structure.

Historically, the JVP vehemently opposed devolution, seeing it as a threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. Their staunch resistance to the 13th Amendment or any form of devolution of powers fueled deep distrust among Tamils. They believed that giving more power to Tamil regions would ultimately lead to Sri Lanka breaking apart. This fear was tied to their strong support for Sinhala nationalism. During the past decades, they actively fought against any proposals for devolution, seeing them as dangerous concessions that threatened Sri Lanka’s unity (Venugopal, 2010).

However in recent years the JVP has softened their stance, suggesting a willingness to engage with the issue of devolution. However, this engagement remains cautious and ambiguous. Their 2019 manifesto, while acknowledging the distinct needs of the Tamil community in the North and East, stopped short of explicitly endorsing federalism, a key demand of many Tamil political actors. Instead, they proposed practical measures such as appointing Tamil speaking officials in the North and East and establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address violence against Muslims, stopping short of committing to full implementation of the 13th Amendment (JVP, 2019). This framing is still evident in their 2021 booklet where, despite advocating for decentralization, they avoid explicitly endorsing federalism. This suggests that the JVP, despite their rhetorical shift towards inclusivity, remains wary of any arrangement that could be seen by their core constituency as challenging the concept of a unitary state.

This shows a pattern. While the JVP is willing to make some changes that address specific concerns, it avoids endorsing anything that might upset their Sinhala nationalist supporters such as sharing real power. This hesitation likely comes from trying to balance minorities’ needs with the concerns of their Sinhala nationalist base, who fear federalism might lead to separatism. Their performance in the 2015 and 2019 elections shows the difficulty of handling this sensitive issue. Despite their attempts to present a viable leftist alternative, they struggled to break through the deeply divided political scene.

Their current approach favors gradual reform over radical change. In their official newspaper, Red Power, the JVP acknowledges the historical injustices faced by certain communities and advocates for a genuine political solution that ensures equal rights and opportunities for all. At the same time, the JVP continues to walk a tightrope on devolution. While acknowledging the historical injustices faced by certain communities and advocating for a genuine political solution that ensures equal rights and opportunities for all, the party’s continued emphasis on national unity and criticism of “separatist tendencies” suggests a cautious approach towards federalism. By criticizing other political parties that “suppress real issues” by playing the “ethnic card”, they position themselves as a party above ethnic divisions[1]. Instead of endorsing full implementation of the 13th Amendment, they propose strengthening and reforming the existing Provincial Council system[2]. This position allows them to appear open to addressing Tamil concerns while avoiding measures that might be seen as a threat to a unitary Sri Lanka.

Their focus on national unity and cautious approach to anything seen as a threat to Sri Lanka’s unity reflects their reluctance to fully back Tamil demands for more autonomy. In their articles, they draw a clear line between Tamil leaders they label as “communalist” and those advocating for unity, pushing for the marginalization of the former. While this rhetoric may resonate with Sinhalese voters concerned about separatism, it risks further alienating Tamils and other groups.

Aragalaya: a catalyst for change?

The 2022 aragalaya protests, characterized by their unprecedented scale and the diversity of participants, were a major moment in recent history. The protests, fueled by economic hardship and a desire for systemic change, brought to the forefront demands for greater inclusivity, ethnic reconciliation and a more responsive government. Crucially, the aragalaya saw a symbolic shift towards a more inclusive national identity, exemplified by events like the Mullivaikkal Remembrance Day, commemorating Tamil civilians killed in 2009. This commemoration, previously suppressed by the state, saw unprecedented participation from Sinhalese and other communities, including Buddhist priests and other clergy. This event, along with the coming together of religious figures from all faiths to protect protesters from state violence, reflected a powerful counter hegemonic imagination of pluralism and coexistence (Ruwanpura and Saleem, 2024).

Furthermore, the aragalaya highlighted the need to address past injustices, with protesters demanding accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses committed during the civil war. The protests also pushed for constitutional reforms that address power sharing and ethnic representation, specifically targeting the need for greater Tamil self-determination and a reassessment of the 13th Amendment and its limitations. These events and demands presented a unique opportunity for political parties, including the JVP, to re-evaluate their positions and potentially embrace a bolder approach to ethnic relations. However, the JVP’s post-aragalaya pronouncements suggest a continuation of their cautious approach. While acknowledging the need for dialogue and constitutional reform, they have consistently avoided explicitly endorsing federalism or any arrangement that might be seen as fundamentally altering the unitary structure. Their statements instead emphasized protecting Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and ensuring that any constitutional changes would not threaten it, suggesting a continued prioritization of a unitary state over addressing Tamil demands for devolution (Tamil Guardian, 2024a; Economy Next, 2024).

This cautious approach was evident in their response to calls for accountability for past atrocities committed during the war. While the JVP leadership has publicly apologized for their role in the 1988-89 insurrection, their continued commemoration of the “November Heroes” who died in the struggle, framing it as a struggle against “imperialism and Indian expansionism”, suggests a reluctance to fully confront their past and its impact on Tamil communities. This approach aligns with the party’s broader framing of communalism as a tool used by elites to divide the working class and against the country’s interests. By insisting on shared economic grievances, the JVP attempts to create a common ground that transcends ethnic boundaries[3].

The JVP’s engagement with the aragalaya, therefore, raises questions about their ability to respond to the calls for genuine reconciliation and a more inclusive country. While their participation in the protests and their criticism of the ruling regime might resonate with some voters, their reluctance to address the core issues of devolution and accountability for past injustices could hinder their efforts to build trust with the Tamil community.

Internal tensions and the path forward

The JVP’s navigation of ethnic relations is further complicated by potential internal divisions within the party. While party leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has recently hinted at a more conciliatory approach, publicly acknowledging the need for dialogue and constitutional reform, including suggesting a willingness to implement the 13th Amendment, other senior members have expressed more hard-line views, emphasizing national unity and security and even boasting about their role in defeating “separatist terrorism”. This dissonance, amplified in the wake of the Aragalaya’s calls for systemic change, raises questions about whether a genuine shift in their stance on ethnic issues is underway.

As the JVP prepares for the 2024 elections, their ability to balance these competing pressures and navigate the complexities of Sri Lanka’s ethnic relations will be crucial. Will they continue walking a tightrope, attempting to appease both Sinhala nationalist and minorities’ constituencies without fully committing to either? Or will they take a more decisive stance on devolution and actively engage with the concerns of the Tamil community, demonstrating a genuine commitment to building a truly inclusive and equitable Sri Lanka? The answer to this question might determine their success in the upcoming election and their long term legitimacy as a force for positive change in Sri Lankan politics.

[1] Red Power, Jun 2023

[2] From Red Power, Aug 2023

[3] As seen in Red Power, Jun and Sep 2023

The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 2)