Let Us Resolve To Carry On Sivaram

nuhwd;Nuh gy;fiyf;fofj;jpy; rptuhk; epidtQ;ryp
tpahof;fpoik> 7 A+d; 2007> Gjpdk; epUgu;

fdlh nuhwd;Nuh gy;fiyf;fofj;jpy; khkdpju; rptuhk; ,uz;lhk; Mz;L epidtQ;ryp epfo;T fle;j 3Mk; ehs; eilngw;wJ.

,e;epidtQ;rypia fdba jkpou; Nguit Vw;ghL nra;jpUe;jJ.

epfo;tpy; dba jkpou; Nguitapd; jiytu; Nguhrpupau; Nahnrg; re;jpufhe;jd; NgrpajhtJ:

vd;nwd;Wk; kpspUk; vOj;J td;ik gilj;jtu; rptuhk;;. mjid xLf;fg;gl;l kf;fSf;F MjuthfTk; mlf;fpahSk; mjpfhu tu;f;fj;Jf;F vjpuhfTk; gad;gLj;jp ePjpia epiyepWj;jg; Gwg;gl;ltu; mtu;;. jhk; <e;j nfhilapdhy; jkJ kf;fspd; tPudhf kl;Lkd;wp, cyf kf;fs; midtuJk; tPudhf cau;e;jtu; mtu;. jdJ nrhe;jg; ghJfhg;igAk; nghUl;gLj;jhJ khDlj;jpd; cr;r tpOkpaq;fSf;fhfg; ghLgl;ltu; mtu;. mj;jifa xUtiug; gpwg;gpj;j NgW gilj;jtu;fs; jkpo; kf;fs;.

nuhwd;Nuh gy;fiyf;fof jkpo; khztu; mitiar; Nru;e;j Jsrp jpUr;nry;tk;:

,uz;L Mz;LfSf;F Kd;du; ele;j ju;kuj;jpdk; juhf;fp rptuhk; mtu;fspd; gLnfhiyf;Fg; nghWg;ghdtu;fs;, vkJ fhyj;jpy; XahJ Xq;fp xypj;j Fuy;fSs; xd;iw xLf;fj; jiyg;gl;ltu;fs; vd;gjpy; Iakpy;iy. mtUila Fuiy mtu;fs; jw;fhypfkhf xLf;fpapUf;fyhk;. vdpDk; mtu; Fuy; vd;nwd;Wk; vjpnuhypf;Fk;. gy tiffspy; juhf;fp xU Kd;Ndhb. mtu; cyfshtpa tpOkpaq;fSf;fhfg; ghLgl;l xU Gtpaurpay; Ma;thsu; vOj;jhsu; khj;jpuky;y xU kf;fs; FOkk; gLk; my;yy;fis KO cyfj;Jf;Fk; vLj;jpak;Gtjw;fhfg; Gjpjha; vOe;j Clf Copia ehba nrk;ky; vd;whu; mtu;.

fdlh ehl;by; xd;uhwpNah khfhzj;jpy;- nuhwd;Nuh khefuj;jpy; wnard; gy;fiyf;fofj;jpy; ju;kuj;jpdk; juhf;fp rptuhk; epidthfg; Gyikg;guprpy; toq;Fk; jpl;lk; cUthf;fg;gl;Ls;s nra;jpia fdba jkpou; Nguit ,e;epidtQ;rypapy; mwptpj;jJ.

Gyikg;guprpiy mwptpj;J fdba jkpou; Nguitiar; Nru;e;j Kusp rpwp ehuhazjh]; NgrpajhtJ:

Clftpaypy; ,skhdpg; gl;lk; ehbg; gapYk; khztu; xUtu; kdpj cupikfisAk; Fbrhu; cupikfisAk; Ngzpf;fhj;J Nkk;gLj;Jk; Jiwapy; rpwe;Njhq;Ftjw;F ,e;j mwf;nfhil Jizepw;Fk;. toikahf Clfq;fspy; Ngrg;glhjtu;fspd; Fuiy Xq;fp xypf;fr; nra;Ak; gzpf;F mjpKjd;ik mspf;fg;gLk;.

",g;Gyikg;guprpiy Kd;itf;Fk; jWthapy; vkJ vjpu;ghu;g;ig ,j;jhy; ehk; ntspg;gLj;JfpNwhk;: Clfj; Jiwapy; Mu;tk;nfhz;l khztu;fs; rptuhk; vd;gtu; ahu;? vd;Dk; tpdhTf;F tpil fhz;gu; vd;Nw ehk; vjpu;ghu;f;fpNwhk;. tpil fhz;gjd; njhlf;fk; mtu; xU jkpou; vd;gij mwptjhfyhk;. mtu; Xu;; Clfj; JiwQu;. cs;sij cs;sgb ciuj;j xU jkpo; Clfj; JiwQu; vd;gjw;fhfNt mtu; nfhy;yg;gl;lhu;. Clfj; JiwAs; GFNthupd; cs;sj;Js; ,J XahJ miyNkhJk; tYtha;e;j fij MFk;.

cq;fs; cjTnjhif KOtJk; ju;kuj;jpdk; juhf;fp rptuhk; epidthf toq;fg;gLk; Gyikg;guprpYf;Nf gad;gLj;jg;gLk; vd;gijr; Rl;bf;fhl;Lk; thf;FWjpg; gbtq;fis wnard; gy;fiyf;fofj;jplkpUe;J ehk; ngw;Wf; nfhz;Ls;Nshk;. vkJ kf;fs; 2007 jprk;gu; 31k; jpfjpf;Fs;; $ 25-000 njhifia toq;fpaTld; ,g;gzpia epiwNtw;WtNj vkJ Nehf;fk;. mjw;F ,d;Nw thf;FWjp mspAq;fs;. tiuahJ toq;f thf;FWjp mspAq;fs;

vd;W ehk; cq;fis Ntz;bf;nfhs;fpNwhk;. ePq;fs; toq;Fk; njhiff;F Kw;wpYk; tupf; fopTz;L. cq;fSld; el;GwT nfhz;ltu;fsplk; ,jw;F cjTnjhif nrYj;JkhWk; rptuhk; <e;j nfhiliaf; fl;bf;fhf;FkhWk; Nfl;Lf;nfhs;sTk; vd;whu; mtu;.

njd; fnwhiydh gy;fiyf;fofg; Nguhrpupau; khu;f; itNjfu; Mw;wpa rpwg;Giuapy;, jhk; khDltpay; Jiwapy; fs Muha;r;rpg; gzp Gupe;j fhyj;jpy; kl;Lefu; nghJ E}yfj;jpy; itj;J rptuhk; mtu;fis Kjd;Kjy; re;jpj;jJ njhl;L ,Wjptiu mtUld; G+z;l cwit tpsf;fpAiuj;jhu;. jkJ el;Gwit mtu; czu;r;rpnghq;f tpupj;Jiuj;jhu;.

rptuhk; fw;gpj;j murpay; vd;W ngaupl;L jhk; mz;ikapy; ntspapl;l Gj;jpkhd;kpa rupijapypUe;J rpy $Wfis mtu; mitNahu;f;F thrpj;Jf; fhl;bdhu;.

kl;lf;fsg;G thtpapd; Kd;wypy; xU tPl;ilf; fl;b Fspu;fhw;W mjidr; R+Oe;NjhWk; flypd; miyfs; fhjpy; rPWe;NjhWk; jd;Dld; el;Gf; nfhz;ltu;fisAk; jd;id te;J re;jpg;gtu;fisAk; rupepfuha; <u;j;J mtu;fis murpay; Kjy; jj;Jtk; tiuahd Jiwfspy; Njha;j;J kfpo;tpg;gjw;F mtu; vd;nwd;Wk; Mty; nfhz;bUe;jhu;.

mtUila tho;ehspy; mJ if$ltpy;iy. vdpDk; ,g;Gyikg;guprpy; thapyhf nuhwd;Nuh khefuj;jpy; mJ ,d;W if$bAs;sJ vd;Wk; mtu; njuptpj;jhu;.

mkuu; rptuhKld; neLq;fhykha; cwthba, tpd;ru; gy;fiyf;fofg; Nguhrpupau; cUj;jpu%u;j;jp Nrud;, jkpo;g; gilg;ghspfs; fofj; jiytu; Nt. jq;fNtY (ef;fPud;) ciuahw;wpdhu;fs;.

nuhwd;Nuh gy;fiyf;fof jkpo; khztu; mitaj; jiytu; nry;tp R[dp fpU];zypq;fk; ed;wpAiu ey;fpdhu;.

(fle;j A+d; 3 Mk; ehs; nuhwd;Nuh gy;fiyf; fof kUj;Jt mwptpay; fl;bl kf;nyhapl; muq;fpy; ele;j khkdpju; jUkuj;jpdk; rptuhk; mtu;fsJ ,uz;lhtJ Mz;L epidT tzf;f epfo;T ,lk;ngw;wJ. mjidj; njhlHe;J ele;j epidT ciuapd; NghJk; ef;fPud; jkpopYk; Mq;fpyj;jpYk; ciuahw;wpdhH. ,J mtuJ jkpo; ciu)

fdba jkpoH Nguitapd; jiytH mtHfNs> jpUkjp rptuhk; mtHfNs> ngupNahHfNs. jha;khHfNs> ez;gHfNs cq;fs; vy;NyhUf;Fk; vdJ tzf;fk;.

kiwe;j khkdpjH jUkuj;jpdk; rptuhk; mtHfsJ ,uz;lhz;L epidT ciu Mw;w cq;fs; Kd; fdj;j ,jaj;Jld; epw;fpNwd;. ,g;gbahd epfo;tpy; ciuahw;WtJ fbdkhdJ. mtiug;gw;wpa gioa epidtiyfis kPl;nlLf;Fk; NghJ ftiy mjpfupf;fpwJ. Mwpa Gz;iz kPz;Lk; Njhz;bg; ghHg;gJ Nghd;wJ.

khkdpjH rptuhkpd; ,og;G <Lnra;a Kbahj ,og;G. ,J xg;Gf;Fr; nrhy;Yk; thHj;ijfs; my;y. xU mwpthspia ehk; ,oe;Jtpl;Nlhk;. rpwe;j rpe;jidahsid ,oe;J tpl;Nlhk;. vkJ kz;izAk; kf;fisAk; fhjypj;j xU jkpo;j; Njrpathjpia ,oe;Jtpl;Nlhk;. vy;yhtw;wpw;Fk; Nkyhf xU ey;y Jiztid jpUkjp rptuhk; ,oe;J tpl;lhH. mtuJ gps;isfs; md;Gj; je;ijia ,oe;J tpl;lhHfs

rptuhk; xU rpwe;j vOj;jhsd;. gilj;Jiw gw;wpa Ma;Tf; fl;Liufis Ehw;Wf; fzf;fpy; vOjpf; Ftpj;jtH. jkpo;> Mq;fpyk; vd ,uz;L nkhopfspYk; Gyik ngw;wtH. ClftpayhsHfs; kj;jpapy; xU ,kak; Nghy; tyk; te;jtH.

,q;Nf NgrpatHfs; khkdpjH rptuhik Njtd; jd;NdhL itj;Jf; nfhz;bUg;gjw;fhf ,sikapNyNa mtiu mioj;Jf; nfhz;lhH vd;whHfs;. rhtpw;Fg; gpd;Dk; xU tho;T ,Ug;gjhfr; nrhd;dhHfs;. fpwpj;jt kjk; kl;Lky;y ,e;J kjKk; kdpjd; ,wf;Fk; NghJ cly;jhd; mopfpwJ. capH moptjpy;iy vdr; nrhy;fpwJ. vq;fsJ md;Gf;Fg; ghj;jpukhdtHfs; ,wf;Fk; NghJ mjid kdk; xg;Gf;nfhs;s kWf;fpwJ. mjdhy; mtHfsJ G+jTly; kiwe;jhYk; mtHfs; njhlHe;J tho;fpwhHfs; vd;w ek;gpf;if kdJf;F MWjy; mspf;fpwJ vd;gJ cz;ikNa.

rhT epr;rakhdJ. mjpy; ,Ue;J ahUk; jg;g KbahJ. Mdhy; me;jr; rhT ,aw;ifahf ,Uf;f Ntz;Lk;. khkdpjH rptuhk; ,aw;ifr; rhT va;jtpy;iy. ,ilapy; mtuJ capiuf; fhjfHfs; gwpj;J tpl;lhHfs;.

khkdpjH rptuhk; nfhiy nra;ag;gl;l NghJ mtUf;F mfit 46. vd;Dila mfitNahL xg;gpl;Lg; ghHf;Fk; NghJ ghjpf;Fr; rw;W mjpfk;. mtH ,d;Dk; gy;yhz;L ,e;j cyfpy; tho;e;jpUf;f Ntz;Lk;. Mdhy; mtiu mtuJ vjpupfs; gLnfhiy nra;J tpl;lhHfs;. ,jpy; cs;s Nrhfk; vd;dntd;why; mtuJ Kd;dhs; NjhoHfs;jhd; mtiuf; Nfhioj;jdkhd Kiwapy; nfhiy nra;jhHfs;.

ehd; rptuhk; ma;yd;l; (The Island) ehNsl;by; vOjj; njhlq;fpd fhyk;njhl;L mtuJ Mf;fq;fisg; gbj;J tUfpNwd;. njhlf;f fhyj;jpy; mtuJ vOj;Jf;fs; ngUk;ghYk; tp.Gypfisf; fz;bj;Nj vOjg;gl;ld.

rptuhk; Jg;ghf;fpiaf; fPNo itj;Jtpl;Lg; Ngdhitf; ifapy; vLj;Jf; nfhz;lhYk; rkTlik (NrhryPr) murpay; Nfhs;ghl;by; ,Ue;j ek;gpf;ifia mtH ,of;ftpy;iy. Mdhy; jkpopdj;Jf;F vjpuhd njd;dpyq;if rpq;fs murpay;thjpfs; ff;fpa gr;ir ,dthjk; mtiu nky;y nky;y xU jkpo;j; Njrpathjpahf cUkhw;wpaJ. gpw;fhyj;jpy; jd; kz;zpd; tpLjiyf;Fk; kf;fspd; tpLjiyf;Fk; jdJ Ngdhit XahJ gad;gLj;jpdhH.

mtuJ Mq;fpyf; fl;Liufs; fLikahd eilapy; vOjg;gl;bUf;Fk;. xU Kd;dhs; Nghuhsp vg;gb Mq;fpyj;jpy; ,t;tsT ruskhf vOJfpwhH vd;w Nfs;tp vdf;Fs; gy Mz;Lfs; ePbj;jJ. nghJthf jq;fs; gs;spg;gbg;ig ,ilapy; epWj;jptpl;L ,af;fq;fspy; jq;fis ,izj;Jf; nfhz;ltHfs; nghJ rhjhuz NjHTf;Fg; gbj;jtHfs;. $baJ caHju tFg;G tiu gbj;jtHfs;. xU rpyNu gy;fiyf; fofg; gbg;ig ,ilap;y; iftpl;L Nghuhl;lj;jpy; Fjpj;jtHfs;. mtHfspy; khkdpjH rptuhk; xUtH. mtH Ngunjdpah gy;fiyf; fofj;jpy; Kjyhz;L gbj;Jf; nfhz;bUe;j nghONj gbg;Gf;F KOf;Fg; Nghl;Ltpl;L Nghuhl;lj;jpy; Fjpj;Jtpl;lhH.

rptuhkpd; Mq;fpyg; Gyikf;fhd fhuzj;ijg; gpd;dHjhd; njupe;J nfhz;Nld;. r;ptuhk; xU gbj;j FLk;gj;jpy; gpwe;J tsHe;jtH. mtuJ ghl;ldhH kl;lf;fsg;G njw;Fj; njhFjpapy; (,d;iwa mk;ghiu kw;Wk; kl;lf;fsg;G njw;F epyg;gug;G) Nghl;bapl;L ntd;W rl;lrigapy; 1938 njhlq;fp 1943 tiu cWg;gpduhf ,Ue;jtH. mtH jUkuj;jpdk; td;dpahH vd kf;fshy; miof;fg;gl;lhH. mtuJ je;ijahH Gtpuh[fPHj;jp Nfk;gpup[; gy;fiyf; fofk; gw;wpg; gyH Nfs;tpg;glhj ehs;fspy; mjpy; gbj;jtH.

rpW taJ KjNy rptuhk; mtHfSf;Fg; Gj;jfq;fs; gbf;Fk; gof;fk; ,Ue;jJ. mtuJ jhahH mtH vd;d Gj;jfk; Ntz;Lk; vd;W Mirg;gl;;lhNuh clNd mij thq;fg; gzk; nfhLj;JtpLthH. kl;lf;fsg;G Ehy; epiyaj;jpy; cs;s Ehy;fs; mj;jidiaAk; rptuhk; gbj;J Kbj;J tpl;ljhfr; nrhy;fpwhHfs;.

fhuy; khHf;];> nydpd;> Nrf;];gpaH> NgdhHl; N\h> khf;fpaty;yp> fTby;ad;> rd; #> ckhH fahk;> jpU%yH> jpUts;StH> mt;itahH Nghd;NwhH vOjpa Ehy;fis gs;spapy; gbf;Fk;NghNj rptuhk; thrpj;J Kbj;Jtpl;lhH. gjpnzz; rpj;jHfisAk; mtH tpl;L itf;ftpy;iy. ,e;j Ehy;fisg; gbj;jjpdhy; fpilj;j mwpNt mtH vOjpa fl;Liufspy; fhzg;gl;l fdjpf;Fk; Gyikf;Fk; fhuzkhf ,Ue;jJ.

ehd; rptuhk; mtHfis 1999 Mk; Mz;Ljhd; Kjd; Kjypy; Neupy; re;jpj;Njd;. fhy;ld; gy;fiyf; fof khztHfsJ mikg;ghd Academic Society of Tamil Students xU midj;Jyf khehl;il xl;lhthtpy; $l;bapUe;jJ. jkpo;j; NjrpaKk; mikjpf;fhd NjlYk; (Tamil Nationhood and Search for Peace) vd;gNj khehl;bd; njhdpg; nghUshFk;. me;j khehl;by; gy mwpQHfs; fye;J nfhz;lhHfs;. kl;lf;fsg;G ehlhSkd;w cWg;gpdH NahNrg; guuhrrpq;fk;> kUj;JtH n[ayj; n[atHj;jdh> vk;. tre;juhrh> tp.Gypfspd; rl;l MNyhrfH cUj;jpuFkhud;> tof;fwpQH fud; ghHf;fH> tof;fwpQH FkhH nghd;dg;gyk;> fyhepjp tpf;fpukghF fUzuj;jpd> NguhrpupaH rp. kNdhfud;> khHf;ful; Trawick> jUkuj;jpdk; rptuhk; cl;gl NkYk; gyH fye;J nfhz;lhHfs;. fyhepjp Nt. ,yFg;gps;is khehl;bd; ,izg;ghsuhfg; gzpahw;wpdhH.

rptuhk; “=yq;fhtpy; Clf Xugl;rKk; Nkhjy;gw;wpa nra;jpfspd; jzpf;ifAk;”(Media Bias and Censorship in Conflict Reporting in Sri Lanka) vd;w jiyg;gpy; fl;Liu thrpj;jhH. .

khehl;L muq;Ff;F ntspNa rptuhk; ed;whf cLj;jp fk;gPukhf epd;W nfhz;bUe;jhH. vd;idf; fz;lTld; ,q;Fs;s xU vOj;jhsupd; ngaiur; nrhy;yp “mtd; ms;sp itr;rpLthd;. ftdk;” vd;whH. mtH NgRk;NghJ Ngr;Rj;jkpopNyNa NgRthH. mtH Vd; mg;gbr; nrhd;dhH vd;gJ njupatpy;iy. ehd; Nfl;fTk; ,y;iy. “vd;idg;gw;wpf; ftiyg; glhjPHfs;. nfhOk;gpy; ,Uf;Fk; ePq;fs;jhd; ftdkhf ,Uf;f Ntz;Lk;” vd;W nrhy;yptpl;L efHe;Njd;.

mjd; gpd; mt;tg;NghJ kpd;dQ;ry; %yk; njhlHG itj;Jf; nfhz;Nld;. 2004 Mk; Mz;L rpfhNfhtpy; ,aq;Fk; cyfj;jkpo; FOkk; xU fUj;juq;Ff;F Vw;ghL nra;jpUe;jJ. mjw;F rptuhk; mthfis mioj;jpUe;jhHfs;. bnrk;gH 11 Mk; ehs; fUj;juq;F eilngw ,Ue;jJ. vdNt mjw;F Kd;dNu Gwg;gl;L te;J fdlhtpy; 2 fpoik jq;fp epd;Wtpl;L epA+ NaHrpf;Fg; Nghq;fs; vd;W mtuplk; Nfl;Nld;. mtuJ vz;zKk; mJthfNt ,Ue;jJ. Kd;dUk; fdlhtpy; cs;s mtuJ neUq;fpa cwtpdHfisg; ghHf;fg; gyKiw ,q;F te;J nrd;wpUf;fpwhH. vdNt ek;gpf;ifNahL fdba JhJtuhyaj;Jf;F -tprhTf;F - tpz;zg;gpj;jhH. mtuJ ek;gpf;iff;Ff; fhuzk; mjw;F Kd;dH fdlh te;J Nghtjw;F tprh nfhLj;jpUe;jhHfs;. Mdhy; ,k;Kiw mtiu Neupy; $g;gpl;L tprhupf;fhkNy “Visa refused ” vd;W Kj;jpiu Fj;jp mDg;gp tpl;lhHfs;.

epA+ NaHrpapy; ele;j fUj;juq;fpy; “njd;fpof;F Mrpahtpd; fly;topg; ghijfSk; mtw;wpd; Nfe;jpu Kf;fpaj;Jtk;” vd;w jiyg;gpy; NgrpdhH.

md;iwa fUj;juq;fpy; rptuhik tpl ,d;Dk; ,uz;L mwpQHfs; fye;J nfhz;L NgrpdhHfs;. xUtH nrd;idg; gy;fiyf; fofg; nghUspay; NguhrpupadH vk;. ehfehjd;. ,tH ,g;NghJ jkpo;ehL jpl;lkply; Mizaj;jpy; Jiz Mizahsuhfg; gzp GupfpwhH. kw;wtH ,e;jpa fk;A+dp];l; fl;rpapd; Njrpa nrayhsH b. ,uhrh. ,tH ,e;jf; fpoik khepyq;fs; mitf;F jkpo;ehL rl;lkd;wj;jhy; Nghl;bapd;wpj; njupT nra;ag;gl;Ls;shH.

rpptuhk; ve;j Fwpg;Gk; ifapy; ,y;yhJ xU kzp Neuk; NgrpdhH. xU NguhrpupaH tFg;G vLg;gJ Nghd;W mtuJ Ngr;R ,Ue;jJ. kpf MWjyhfNt Fuiy caHj;jp – jho;j;jhJ NgrpdhH.

njw;fhrpah fly;g; gug;ig jdJ fl;Lg;ghl;Lf;Fs; itf;f tpUk;Gk; mnkupf;fh ,e;J rKj;jpuj;jpd; eLtpy; cs;s bNfh fhHrpa jPtpy; Nfe;jpu Kf;fpak; tha;e;j gilj; jsj;ij mikj;Js;sJ.

1991 kw;Wk; 2003 ,y; ,uhf;Ff;F vjpuhd Nghupy; bNfh fhHrpah jsk; Kf;fpa gq;F tfpj;jJ. mq;F epWj;jp itf;fg;gl;bUe;j gp-2> gp-52 Fz;L tPr;R tpkhdq;fNs 100 f;Fk; Nkyhd ePz;l Jhu VTfisfis ,uhf; kPJ tPrpd. 2001 Mk; Mz;L xf;NjhgH khjj;jpy; mNj bNfh fhHrpa jsj;jpy; epWj;jp itf;fg;gl;bUe;j gp-2> gp-52 tpkhdq;fisg; gad;gLj;jp Mg;fdp];jhd; kPJ mnkupf;fh VTfizj; jhf;FjiyAk; elj;jpaJ. gp-52 uf tpkhdq;fs; 10>000 fy; Jhuk; vz;nza; kPs; epug;ghJ gwf;ff; $bad.

bNfh fhHrpah ,e;Njhdprpah – gpypg;igd;]; ,uz;Lf;Fk; rkJhuj;jpy; ,Uf;fpwJ. Mg;fhdp];jhdpy; ,Ue;J rw;Wf; Fiwe;j njhiytpy; cs;sJ. bNfh fhHrpah njd;dpe;jpahtpy; ,Ue;J njw;Nf 1>000 fy; njhiytpy; ,Uf;fpwJ. ,it fhuzkhf mnkupf;fh jpUNfhzkiyj; JiwKfj;jpy; fz; itj;jpUg;gjhf rptuhk; tpsf;fpdhH.

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On the day my friend and colleague Dharmaratnam Sivaram (Taraki) was murdered I was blissfully ignorant of the tragedy unfolding in Colombo city till very late in the evening. On that fateful day, I was attending the International Conference hosted by Caldwell Educational Conference Organizers Inc, Toronto, Vasantham and Carleton Thamil Graduates Union, Ottawa and held at Grand Hotel, Toronto. Tsunami Disaster in Sri Lanka: Opportunities and Obstacles for Rehabilitation and Resettlement was the theme of the conference. There were panel discussions in which prominent scholars and experts spoke on a diverse subjects related to tsunami. The morning session was chaired by Prof. Joseph Chandrakanthan of the UoT.

On reaching home, I noticed my answering machine blinking. So even before changing cloths I started retrieving the messages. Among several messages, there was a short message left by the editor of Muzhakkam weekly newspaper. It said that there are unconfirmed reports that Sivaram (Taraki) has been abducted by unidentified gunmen at Bambalapitiya at around 10.45 p.m. the same day.

Thereafter, I received several calls and then went and checked the TamilNet. It carried a brief news item that confirmed the abduction story.

A little later other wire-news started carrying the bad news. Many bizarre scenes raced through my mind. I was trying to figure out the consequences. I resigned myself to the inevitable bad news sooner or later. It is a well known fact that abductors normally don’t release their victims for fear of betraying their identities. Past midnight news agencies reported the founding of Sivaram’s body with gun shot injuries behind the Sri Lankan parliamentary complex.

The loss of Sivaram (Taraki) is irreparable. He wielded his mighty pen to seek justice for his people. He was not a mercenary writer like some others. There is no one to replace him or take his place. He was the only Thamil journalist who wrote regularly both in English and Thamil for a very wide international audience. His articles and interviews were published and re-published in several newspapers and web-sites abroad. His superb in-depth analysis on defence and politics earned him respect not only locally but also from foreign diplomats, bureaucrats, journalists and educationists. He was invited by the US State Department for briefings. He was also invited by the Indian Foreign Ministry for similar briefings.

Sivaram took to journalism after falling out with PLOTE chief Uma Maheswaran. He was then the General Secretary of Democratic Peoples Liberation Front (DPLF), the political wing of PLOTE. In the early days he was critical of LTTE’s policies and tactics.

When in 1991, LTTE mounted a frontal attack and laid siege to Elephant Pass military base, the then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali and army top brasses were at wits end not knowing how to rescue the forces entrapped inside. The army broke the siege finally by landing its forces at Vettilaikerni and marching towards Elephant Pass. It took a whole month to do so and the army suffering heavy casualties. It was claimed that the idea for the naval landing at Vettilaikerni came from reading Taraki’s articles.

Over time Taraki dropped his anti-LTTE stance when he realized that Sri Lankan governments of whatever hues are incapable of offering any reasonable solution to end the festering ethnic conflict. His reading of the socio-political history of Ceylon taught him a few lessons. He concluded that Sinhala polity will never agree to share political power with the Thamil people.

Sivaram figured out two important historical factors. Firstly, he found the Sinhalese ethnic identity is all –inclusive ethno-religious identity, that is Sinhalese Buddhists. It is impossible to think of Sinhalese ethnic identity sans Buddhism. Secondly the myth, artificial but deliberate, linking Vijaya’s landing with the passing of Buddha into Nibbana (death and enlightenment). Buddha just before his death was supposed to have summoned Sakka (Indra) and instructed him “Vijaya, son of Sinhabahu, is coming to Lanka ....... together with 700 followers. In Lanka, O Lord of Gods, will my religion be established, therefore, carefully protect him with his followers and Lanka.” This myth has been systematically and continuously exploited by Sinhalese politicians and Buddhist monks to promote the chauvinistic theory that Sinhalese Buddhists are a chosen people entrusted with the task of safeguarding Buddhism in the whole island. In essence it meant the island belonged to Sinhalese Buddhists only.

Secondly the interpretation of war between Elara and Duttugemunu as one between Thamils and Sinhalese Buddhists. As an extension the victorious Duttgemunu a great Sinhalese Buddhist national hero. This fiction is portrayed to paint the Thamils as historical enemies, non-believers, aliens and usurpers by the Sinhalese. Sivaram called this the Mahavamsa mind-set! Sivaram in his writings used to quote passages from such well known Buddhist chronicles like the Deepavamsa, Mahavamsa, Chulavamsa and Rajawalia, in that order, to reinforce his argument. He even quoted the Kandyan Convention to prove Sinhalese historical animosity towards Thamils. The Kandyan Convention signed between the British and the Kandyan chiefs consisted of 12 clauses of which the following four are significant and give an insight in to the Sinhala psyche.

1. Sri Wickreme Rajasinha, the Malabari king to forfeit all claims to the throne of Kandy.

2. The king is declared fallen and deposed and the hereditary claim of his dynasty abolished and extinguished.

5. The religion of the Buddha is declared inviolable and its rights to be maintained and protected.

Sivaram gradually came to admire the superior fighting’s skills, military strategy and tactics of the LTTE in fighting the Sinhalese armed forces. Especially LTTE leader’s far-sighted leadership by example. Sivaram, once an armed militant himself, was convinced that LTTE possessed the necessary military prowess to fight the occupying Sinhalese army and finally expelling it from Thamil homeland.

I met Sivaram for the first time in 1999 in Ottawa. He was one of many prominent scholars who spoke at the International Conference On Tamil Nationhood & Search for Peace in Sri Lanka. The Conference was hosted by the Academic Society of Tamil Students, Carleton University, Canada from 21-22 May, 1999. Sivaram presented a paper titled Media Bias and Censorship in Conflict Reporting in Sri Lanka. Among others who spoke at the conference were Ms Karen Parker, V. Rudra Kumaran, Dr.wickramabahu Karunaratne, Prof. C. Manogaran, Margaret Trawick just to name a few.

Incidentally, I have both the English and the Thamil versions of the paper he presented.

After 1999, Sivaram visited Canada a few times. His close relatives from his wife’s side live in Canada. Whenever he came he made it a point to see me, but scrupulously avoided public appearances.

Sivaram was planning to spend at least 2 weeks in Canada last December, 2004. He was invited as a guest speaker for a seminar in New Jersey organized by the World Thamil Organization Inc. So he planned to come to Canada before going to US. However, his plan came to naught when the Canadian High Commission in Colombo refused him a visa without even the courtesy of an interview. He was very disappointed since he had no difficulty visiting Canada before. As for US he already had multiple entry visas.

I met him in New Jersey on December 11 and spoke to him before and after the seminar. When asked to pose for photographs, he remarked whether they are meant for use after his death! None of us took his remarks seriously and no one that day had any premonition that death was lurking in the dark. This despite the fact he remained a target of the Sri Lankan army intelligence and pro-government para-military groups. Extreme Sinhalese elements, notably the JVP and Hela Urumaya, published his photos and branded him as a LTTE ‘terrorist.’

In 2001 Sivaram had a close shave with death. He was brutally attacked by a group of persons armed with clubs and batons inside Thinakathir newspaper office in Batticaloa town. Apparently this group had close connections with the security forces. Sivaram suffered extensive head injuries and was hospitalized. He required 5 stitches.

Attack and intimidation of Thamil media persons by security forces have become a routine affair for a considerable period of time. Freedom of the press and the independence of journalists in Sri Lanka is a huge joke. More so for Thamil journalists.

When ever his personal safety was broached Sivaram brushed it aside saying if anyone is determined to kill him nothing could stop it. He also brushed aside the suggestion that he stays abroad for some time till the security situation in Sri Lanka improved.

While he was in US, some of Sivaram’s close friends thought he should be provided with some monetary help as a show of affection rather than to ease his stay. But he did not like the idea. Typical of the man he told me over the phone in colloquial Thamil “ Enakku kAsu thEvai Illai. Nan Mandayai POddAl enathu peNsathy pillaikku uthavi seyunKo!” (I don’t need money! If I die help my wife and children!)

After returning to Sri Lanka, Sivaram was in constant touch with me by phone and email. The last message he sent me was the tidings that Vanni has decided to create a separate department to promote rationalism and science on an institutional basis. Also publication of books on science and rationalism to educate the people. He told me he has read most of my articles I wrote in Muzhakkam and re-published in Thamil Natham web site. Especially the series that debunked belief in Astrology. He thought by writing on social and religious issues, I was doing a great service in weaning people from superstitious beliefs that have become the curse of the Thamil society.

I feel less sad and more angry that the killers stilled his voice so brazenly and in the most brutal fashion.

The question before us is how long we have to put up with the loss of such versatile journalists like Nimalarajan, Nadesan and now Sivaram? How many more lives have to be sacrificed so that the rest could live in peace and dignity?

Eleven days have gone since the gruesome murder of Sivaram, yet the Police say there has been no break-through in apprehending the murderers. Even the vehicle used by the assassins has not been traced. Is this because the GOSL has set those behind Sivaram's killing to catch the killers?

Thamil people abhor the prospect of war resuming once again. They have suffered privation and deprivation well beyond human endurance for two decades. But then what is the alternative to war? Should we allow the destruction of a nation in installments by a shadow war waged by President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her armed forces? It is time we re-think critically and act wisely.

Sivaram’s senseless murder has been condemned by prominent people around the world. UNESCO Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura condemned the murder describing it as a “shameful crime” and his death “a great loss for Sri Lankan journalism and for UNESCO.”

” Man who Knew Too Much Dead" wrote Prof. Prof. Tom Plate, Director of Asia Pacific Media Network, in an article published in Korean Times.

Director Ann Cooper of The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) condemned the murder saying “This audacious and brutal crime is an attack on free speech in Sri Lanka.”

The Foreign Correspondents' Association of Sri Lanka condemned the killing saying “To gun down an unarmed man is pure cowardice; to gun down a journalist is to attack freedom of speech.”

Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders) said “It was revolted at the brutal killing of well known journalist and the premeditated murder of one of the most renowned Tamil journalists is a huge loss for Sri Lanka’s press.”

Sivaram is not among the living any more. A powerful voice of an enslaved people has been silenced for ever. However, his ideas and ideals will survive his death and will live on. Let us then resolve to carry on his unfinished task as a lasting tribute to his loving memory.

Mourning Sivaram

April 28, 2006 at 11:05 pm · Filed under Commentary

by Qadri Ismail

I remember it well and I remember it poorly - the conversation at the Arts Centre Club. It was quite remarkable, actually, in that bar where more than half the regulars were my friends, in that bar where I am sure I had my first drink - either a rum and coke or a gin and lime, certainly, but again I don’t know for sure, although I swear I remember who paid for it - that we appear to have had an uninterrupted conversation. How do I know that? Because parts of it were published a few days (maybe weeks) later in the pages of The Sunday Times. (On the 27th of September, 1987, for those bibliographically inclined.)

I called him Naresh, then, to preserve his anonymity.

He was a member of one of the Tamil militant organizations, of that fine generation of Tamil youth that refused to shirk its responsibilities. And more. He was by any standards brilliant.

He was that rare undergraduate who, when he dropped names, could back it up with a relevant quotation and an intelligently coherent argument. A first class was his for the taking. But he wasn’t a nerd. Sivaram was up to painting the town red. Then, in the second term of his first year, he dropped out.

This might have been 1982. Though 1983 is more likely. I could check. But who cares! History is for those without imagination. (I got that line from a fortune cookie.)

I next met him three years, a race riot and many deaths later. He turned up at my doorstep one evening and asked me if I remembered him. Vain question; he wasn’t easy to forget. He looked very different: shaggy hair, scraggy beard, spectacles tied together with wire, torn track-shoes. We proceeded to talk - or, rather, he did - till the early hours of the morning.

Most of the talking, no doubt, must have happened in a bar somewhere. But, surely, we’d have eaten at home first. Indeed, to this day my mother doesn’t know how many Tamil militants she fed over those years. And I’m not about to tell her.

I asked why he joined up. He replied as if he was saying something self-evident. “What else is there to do?” Then proceeded to relate story after story that gave life to the facts and statistics of Tamil grievances…The idealism came out clearly, as did the commitment, the purpose, the dedication.

That last statement reads embarrassingly now. Idealism is not something I have associated with Sivaram for a long time.

Today he looks like anybody’s favourite son. The beard was trimmed neatly enough to make a naval officer jealous; the jeans were Jordache; the t-shirt, Lacoste; the run down spectacles had given way to Daniel Ortega-style tinted glasses; he had even polished his shoes. After three weeks of the good life in Colombo, one saw the beginnings of a pot.

Maybe that’s when he changed, after the Indo-Lanka Accord. But then, again, who knows?

The conversation turned to the PLOT critique of Tamil separatism and its argument for co-operation with the radical southern left.

He had been drinking arrack all evening. Then he lit a Bristol and said: “The whole enterprise was doomed to failure from the very start.

“Our first mistake was theoretical. We called it a national liberation struggle and compared ourselves to Cuba and Vietnam and Nicaragua. We should have thought of Biafra, of Basque Spain, of Eritrea. They have been fighting for years in Eritrea against Ethiopian repression and nobody cared. You know what Harold Wilson said about Biafra? He said he didn’t care whether a million Ibos had to die, that Nigeria had to remain unified.”

Wilson, we might remind ourselves here, was supposedly a leftist.

“The postwar international system does not permit the creation of new states.”

How about Cyprus, Bangladesh?

He smiled, lit another cigarette. “Turkish Cyprus has not been recognized by any other country apart from Turkey. Bangladesh is a special case. Pakistan was the artificial creation of the British. From the start, the Bengalis had problems with the west Pakis. And it suited India’s geostrategic interests to bifurcate Pakistan.”

What would Sivaram have said today about the many recently-established states, especially Eritrea? I don’t know. I stopped reading his stuff when he became an unapologetic Tamil nationalist. The 1987 Sivaram’s explanation would have gone something like this: The new states emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, like Bangladesh from Pakistan, could be explained by the artificiality of the old states argument. Eritrea, in contrast, would be the perfect example of the PLOT thesis: they got nowhere for years until they made an alliance with anti-Mengistu Ethiopian forces.

But, for our purposes, what is relevant today, what might be useful to think about, is the PLOT assessment of the specificity (or, for the more theoretically minded, singularity) of the Sri Lankan situation. For I would hold now, as a card-carrying literary critic, that analogy - making comparisons or, in this instance, arguing that merely because something happened or did not in one place, it can happen or not in another - is just a plain and simple literary device; not the truth. Those who say we can learn from history forget that history is, to use a term from Aristotle, emplotted: it is something that is made, written. Events do not narrate themselves; they are narrated, ordered, structured - indeed, made into objects we recognize as events - by the discipline and discourse of history.

As for analogy, a clever enough person can compare anything to anything else. Or not, as the case might require. Example: pineapples and oranges are both fruit. They are both sweet, and soury; therein lying their appeal. They are both juicy and are guaranteed to wet the fingers while being eaten. Their color is usually similar. On the other hand, one grows on trees, the other from the ground. One has a smooth skin, the other a prickly one. One has a navel, the other a crown. You get the point…

At a certain stage of the evening, Sivaram got really angry. “What the bloody hell, I say! All those statements against Thamileelam made by India. Couldn’t they realize? India had nothing to gain from creating a separate state here…We had no mountains, no jungles to retreat to and attack from. The Sri Lankan state was so developed that there was a police station within fifteen miles of any place in the country. We had to use India as a rear base. From that point on, we were pawns in a larger chess game, a tool that was going to be used by India to achieve its ends.”

Some of those police stations, of course, have been destroyed by the LTTE; not to mention many army camps. And the Wanni jungles have turned out to be surprisingly attack proof. But the gist of the argument is still persuasive.

“Take the border. It is more than three hundred miles long - and there are Sinhalese at every end of it. Nobody ever thought of this. Nobody in any group came up with an intelligent idea of how it could be secured and then maintained.”

The LTTE had an idea, of course: exterminate all the Sinhalese on the border. But not even an intelligent feline could call it a smart one.

He went on to examine the Tamil economy and ecological environment, as he put it. The Tamils did not have a separate economy. They were dependent on the south for a market. Separation would have caused havoc here. Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. The two eco-systems were inextricably linked. The east got its water from rivers that began in the Sinhala areas. What if something was done to the rivers?

This sounded persuasive to me then. It still does.

Electricity schemes were in the south and supply could be knocked off. And then, he said, take the nature of the state. It was all-pervading and centralized. There was no local capital that could be captured, leading automatically to separation.

Yes, the LTTE has won some remarkable military victories. But they have been unable to refute this thesis.

“And what about the Muslims. We had in our midst a large minority. We artificially tried to make them a part of us by inventing this nonsense of a Tamil-speaking people. They never wanted Thamileelam and we didn’t know what to do about them.”

As with the Sinhalese on the border, the LTTE had a plan for the Muslims: it tried what, in some parts of the world, is called ethnic cleansing.

But the more important, more general point is that, for all these reasons, PLOT rejected separatism in favor of the emancipation, or liberation, of all the people of Sri Lanka by the people of Sri Lanka.

He then defended the Accord. “We fought for our rights. We have not got everything, but all fights must end some day.” The conversation ended on this mournful note: ” As guerillas fighting for Tamil rights, our historical role is over.”

What changed? What transformed Sivaram from a socialist into an unalloyed nationalist - and, even worse, eventually an LTTE lobbyist? Again, we’ll never know.

Some have said it was the continued racism of the Sinhala state. That argument has some merit. But, then, not all of us opposed to the racist Sinhala state - now looking amazingly like it did then, during its Jayawardene/Premadasa incarnation, with the ultra-racist JVP in government (and I am making an analogy here, not a truth-claim) - chose the LTTE as the mode to resist it. Not all of us believe the stupid political science cliché that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s friend. (I mean, look what that logic has done to U.S. imperialism: the enemy - the Taliban - of its one-time enemy - the Soviet Union - is now its nemesis.)

Some will say, given D.B.S. Jeyaraj’s reporting that Sivaram was first rejected by the LTTE, by no less than Mahattaya himself, before he joined PLOT, that his political instincts were always pro-LTTE. That argument also has some merit. But it does not explain his advocacy of the PLOT position that night at the Arts Centre Club.

Others will say that he was simply an opportunist. That is, that he never really changed. Sometimes, I think so too. (After all, he wooed Vijaya Kumaratunga and his killers, the JVP; he hated India - and yet informed the High Commission about his comrades during the Maldives coup.) But it takes guts to promote the LTTE openly, in print, from the south. Opportunism cannot explain that. On the other hand, there are too many stories about Sivaram’s activities within PLOT, going back to the early 1980s, for anyone who knows them to accuse him of courage. The mystery, then, remains.

So what, you might ask, is this all about? Am I mourning, in some eccentric or even perverse fashion, the death - nay, the murder - of an old friend?

Yes, of course. But I’d rather, than dwell on death, take a lesson from his life. From the time we were friends. Good friends.

From the time parts of the Tamil resistance, the radical Tamil left - EPRLF and PLOT - was so incomparably superior, politically and ethically, to the genocidal brutality that was and might still be Sinhala nationalism. (After all, if the JVP controlled the government, we’d surely be at war again by now. Although the president - what on earth is she doing allied with the JVP? - could very well take us down that road, too.) Or, for that matter, the Tamil nationalism of the LTTE.

That ethical time, of the EPRLF and PLOT, need not be understood as past - because it was never really a historical time. Indeed, it is better understood as a moment of the imagination. A moment, unlike now perhaps, when anything seemed possible.

In his famous essay, Freud makes a distinction between mourning and melancholia: the mourner accepts the loss of the object; the melancholic desires its return.

Will we ever see a Tamil left quite like that again? EPRLF and PLOT at its best? (And, yes, I am familiar with PLOT’s atrocities.) Probably not. Though you never know. But we can fucking well insist that we must, and will, be inspired by that imagination.

Qadri Ismail was an attesting witness at the marriage of Sivaram and Yogaranjini. He remembers drinking and laughing a lot that night with some of his funnest buddies: Richard de Zoysa, Newton Gunasinghe, D.B.S. Jeyaraj.

[Qadri Ismail is Associate Professor Department of English University of Minnesota]

[This article appeared in the Lines Magazine in August 2005]

Thereafter, I received several calls and then went and checked the TamilNet. It carried a brief news item that confirmed the abduction story.

Sivaram figured out two important historical factors. Firstly, he found the Sinhalese ethnic identity is all –inclusive ethno-religious identity, that is Sinhalese Buddhists. It is impossible to think of Sinhalese ethnic identity sans Buddhism. Secondly the myth, artificial but deliberate, linking Vijaya’s landing with the passing of Buddha into Nibbana (death and enlightment). Buddha just before his death was supposed to have summoned Sakka (Indra) and instructed him “Vijaya, son of Sinhabahu, is coming to Lanka ....... together with 700 followers. In Lanka, O Lord of Gods, will my religion be established, therefore, carefully protect him with his followers and Lanka.” This myth has been systematically and continuously exploited by Sinhalese politicians and Buddhist monks to promote the chauvinistic theory that Sinhalese Buddhists are a chosen people entrusted with the task of safeguarding Buddhism in the whole island. In essence it meant the island belonged to Sinhalese Buddhists only.

1. Sri Wickreme Rajasinha, the Malabari king to forfeit all claims to the throne of Kandy.

2. The king is declared fallen and deposed and the hereditary claim of his dynasty abolished and extinguished.

5. The religion of the Buddha is declared inviolable and its rights to be maintained and protected.

Incidentally, I have both the English and the Thamil versions of the paper he presented.

After 1999, Sivaram visited Canada a few times. His close relatives from his wife’s side live in Canada. Whenever he came he made it a point to see me, but scrupulously avoided public appearances.

I feel less sad and more angry that the killers stilled his voice so brazenly and in the most brutal fashion.

” Man who Knew Too Much Dead" wrote Prof. Prof. Tom Plate, Director of Asia Pacific Media Network, in an article published in Korean Times.

Director Ann Cooper of The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) condemned the murder saying “This audacious and brutal crime is an attack on free speech in Sri Lanka.”

The Foreign Correspondents' Association of Sri Lanka condemned the killing saying “To gun down an unarmed man is pure cowardice; to gun down a journalist is to attack freedom of speech.”

Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders) said “It was revolted at the brutal killing of well known journalist and the premeditated murder of one of the most renowned Tamil journalists is a huge loss for Sri Lanka’s press.”

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Coercive Airpower in the Eelam Conflict- Taraki

[TamilNet, May 30, 2005 00:11 GMT]
The article on the use of airpower in Eelam conflict written by late Dharmeratnam Sivaram that appeared in the 19 May 1991 issue of the Island gains added significance in view of recent controversy over Liberation Tigers’ alleged possession of Czech made Zlin type Z-143 aircraft. Full text of the article is reproduced in this feature.

The use of air power has been the most salient feature of the current conflict in the north and east. As a consequence of the fact that the LTTE controls a substantial portion of the north- the interior- there have been two types of air operations: tactical and strategic.

Tactical air power is used on the battle field. Strategic air power is used to attack targets behind the battle field- in the opponent’s territory. Tactical air power is part of ordinary military action which seeks to rout opposing forces on the battle field, whereas strategic air power is coercive, in that military coercion seeks to change the opponent’s behavior (agree for a ceasefire, give up conditions or territory, agree to hold talks on terms favorable to the assailant etc) and indirectly affect the opponent’s ability and will to sustain battlefield operations.

Right now in the context of the government’s stated and express desire to conclude, a temporary peace at least, the concept of coercion becomes crucial in examining the role of air power in the war against the Tiger. At the conventional level the military instruments traditionally used for coercion are strategic air and naval forces, while tactical air and ground forces are concerned with directly influencing events on the battle field. (Given the reduced vulnerability of modern states to naval blockades, air power has emerged as the main tool of conventional coercion.) Although technically this country cannot be said to possess a strategic airforce the need to affect the LTTE beyond the warfront in the territory it controls has given rise to strategic bombing.

The central question is, in the north, under what conditions is strategic bombing with conventional munitions likely to create the desired coercive leverage? Coercive air power can be directed at civilian and/or military targets. There are two models which exploit the vulnerability of the civilian population in the opponent’s territory. The first which seeks to gain the enemy’s compliance by slowly raising the risk of civilian damage is called the Schelling Model (the idea of manipulating the risk of civilian punishment for political purposes has largely come to be identified with the work of Thomas Schelling. Others also shared in the development of this idea chief among them Morton Kapalan in his Strategy of limited Retaliation).

Key: Under this strategy bombing would gradually be escalated in intensity, geographical extent or both. “The key however is not to destroy the entire target set (population concentrations and the economic infrastructure that provides the population with essential goods and services) in one fell swoop.” This model’s premise is that coercive leverage comes from the opponent’s anticipation of future damage and hence spares a large part of the opponent’s civilian assets in order to preserve the threat of further destruction. In addition the assailant in this model gives a clear signal that the bombing is contingent on the opponent’s behavior and will be stopped if he complies with the assailant’s demands. (“To be coercive violence has to be anticipated...It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior if the power to hurt can get it at all” – Thomas Schelling ‘Arms and Influence’)

The second counter civilian strategy is called the Douhet model- after its chief proponent Giulio Douhet. It rests in on the belief that infliction of high costs can shatter civilian morale “unraveling the social basis of resistance” and causing citizens to pressure the opponent to abandon his territorial and political ambitions. The Douhet model is simply what is known as terror bombing. However the military theoreticians and generals of the West have established the euphemistic concept instead. Under this strategy it is expected that civilian morale could be damaged by exposing large portions of the population to the terror of destruction by causing severe shortages of services and goods such as food water textiles and industrial goods.

Like the Schelling model the Douhet model focuses on population and economic targets. There is however a fundamental difference. The Schelling model holds ultimate ruin in abeyance. The Douhet model calls for immediate devastation.

The third and final strategy of coercive air power is the Interdiction model. Unlike the Douhet and Schelling models which aim at civilian vulnerability, the Interdiction model aims at the opponents military vulnerabilities. The fundamental premise of the model is that coercive leverage could be secured by attacking rear area military targets.

“The goal is to neutralize the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear on the battle field.” Aerial interdiction sometimes includes economic targets to the extent that these are assumed to be part of the opponent’s ‘war machine.’ (The Industrial Web Theory put forward in the 1930s emphasized precision attacks against critical economic bottlenecks to cause an adversary’s war economy to crumble. During the bombing campaign against Germany, the eight air force targeted armament ball bearing and synthetic oil production as well as the German transportation network.)

The interdiction model assumes that in a conventional dispute or in a guerrilla war which is in the process of incorporating conventional methods, battlefield demands for resources are often inelastic especially in high input conflicts and therefore successful aerial interdiction of critical supplies can quickly lead to military disaster.

Air operations in LTTE controlled territory in the north con be tentatively classified into the Schelling and Interdiction models. How effective was the Schelling model in undermining the LTTE’s will to sustain the war?” (The Douhet model is not possible in Sri Lanka for two reasons. One it does not possess a modern strategic air force and the necessary conventional munitions. Two, the Tiger is not another government). The counter civilian strategy prescribed by the Schelling model is intended inter-alia to distance the people away from those prosecuting the war by posing the risk of destruction and hardship. It certainly led to an exodus to Colombo from the peninsula and presented the Tiger with a possible manpower crisis. But this strategy did not create the desired political crisis for the Tigers because civilian hardships were offset by supplies from Tamilnadu and the extraordinary volume of expatriate remittances.

Valvettithurai: The last occasion on which Valvettithurai was bombed thoroughly- only the Tiger base there was spared- it did not create the necessary volume of open civilian displeasure to coerce the Tiger leadership into considering methods other than war to mitigate the suffering of their kith and kin in their township. Coercive airpower in the form counter civilian Schelling model as used in the peninsula apparently failed to take note of an important fact: that from the late fifties one of the main tasks of Tamil politics has been to impress upon the Tamil population the need to countenance tremendous civilian punishment to achieve important political- and later- territorial aims.

The pogroms of 1958, 1977 and 1983 clearly strengthened the case. The net result is an almost indelible association among the ordinary Tamils between putting up with destruction of civilian assets and lives and the achievement of political objectives or the extraction of concessions from Colombo.

The counter-civilian models of coercive bombing presupposes that economic devastation will undermine civilian morale which in turn would divert the opponent’s attention away from the war front.

Major Muir Fairchild, Britain’s Director of Air Tactics and strategy in World War Two, referring to the counter-civilian coercive airpower had remarked, “ We obviously cannot and do not intend to kill or injure all the people. Therefore our intention in deciding upon this method of attack must be to so reduce the morale of the enemy civilian population through fear- fear of death or injury for themselves or their loved ones- that they would prefer our terms of peace to continuing the struggle and would force their governments to capitulate.” This approach is typical of the military leadership in societies where it is unequivocally under civilian authority dependent on the popular will for its survival.

Did the government gain any coercive leverage through the Schelling model of strategic bombing in the peninsula?

The Tiger’s unilateral ceasefire in January 1991 some may tend to argue was a consequence of it. This is incorrect because civilian vulnerabilities- the objective of the Schelling model- as it was quite evident as soon as the ceasefire was called off did not affect the political will of the LTTE to begin a rapid and intense escalation of its military operations. It is a fallacy amply exposed by many scholars on modern warfare that the punishment of civilian populations by strategic bombing with conventional munitions (unlike in the case of nuclear or biological munitions) can undermine or dislodge the real or assumed leadership of that population. But it continues to claim many adherents in modern military establishments mainly because the equation involved in the counter civilian model is simple.

The LTTE ran a war machine which is not an integral part of the northern economy. The war machine or in other words the infrastructure that is necessary to maintain its troops and battle field operation is located in the ‘interior’: the Tiger controlled portion of the north. Therefore the interdiction model is extremely crucial in determining the outcome of battles as well as in debilitating the LTTE’s ability to ‘oil’ its war apparatus.

Deep interdiction in the ‘interior’ theoretically has to be aimed at ammunition storage facilities food f fuel and explosive supply point communication bases camps and factories where mortars, shells and other war material are produced. Then it has to thwart the LTTE’s ground strategy by choking off the logistical flows on which the strategy is dependent: aerial interdiction of lines of communication between the battle front and bases or population centers.

Deep interdiction can be successful only if targets are correctly identified and if the industrial infrastructure necessary for the production of mortars and shells is part of the Jaffna economy. The problem, however, is that this industrial infrastructure that is necessary for metal casting, making of moulds, precision lathes etc is located in Tamilnadu.

Although camps had been on many occasions correctly identified they were more often than not bombed days after the Tigers vacated them. This rotation system of setting up camps in the peninsula has posed difficulties for aerial interdiction.